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Professionalism, Oversight, and InstitutionBalancing: The Supreme Court's "Second Best"
Plan for Political Debate on Television
Lili Levit
Televised politicaldebates have become a staple of modern elections.
Proponents of open access to such debates argue that third party
participation is a democratic necessity. They see as catastrophic the
Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes, in which a state broadcaster was given the
discretion to exclude a minor party candidatefrom a televised debate so
long as the decision was viewpoint-neutral. This Article reads the Court's
decision as a functional, "second best" solution that seeks to mediate the
expressive and democratic values implicated in both open and closedaccess models. More generally, the Article sees in Forbes germs of an
institution-balancingvision ofpolitics in the media. Under this approach,
public broadcasters would be empowered to serve as realistic
programming counterweights to the electoral coverage of the commercial
media. While there are reasons to be skeptical about the ultimate
effectiveness of this institution-balancing strategy, only until refined,
election-specific and historically-grounded data are collected and
assessed in a context-specific fashion can we begin to evaluate the Court's
approachin application.
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Introduction
One of the major policy issues of the 2000 presidential election
season was whether candidates other than Vice President Albert Gore and
Governor George Bush would be permitted to participate in the
presidential debates. Much controversy accompanied the decision of the
Commission on Presidential Debates ("CPD") to set the debate inclusion
threshold at a public support figure that effectively excluded all but the
Democratic and Republican candidates. Demonstrating public engagement
with the issue, legal claims were supplemented by street protests: Thirdparty proponents staged a "Boston TV Party," dumping televisions into
Boston Harbor to protest Ralph Nader's exclusion from the first
Bush/Gore debate.'
Debate access is one part of a much larger renaissance of arguments
for campaign reform.2 The power of the purse in elections and the
I
See, e.g., Eric Bailey, Campaign 2000, Shut Out of the Debates, Nader and Buchanan
Have Plenty of Company, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2000, at A13; Marcella Bombardieri, Activists Take
Time to Speak Up, Presidential Debate a Good Opportunity to be Seen and Heard, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 3, 2000, at BI.
2
On the media front, in addition to free access to political debates as an antidote to the
poverty of media political coverage, campaign reformers since the last presidential election have been
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dominance of the Democratic and Republican parties in the electoral field
have triggered calls for democracy-enhancing corrections. Proponents of
liberal debate access rights worry that failing to require participatory
diversity further entrenches the duopoly of American politics and
precludes any true political alternatives to the status quo. By contrast,
opponents of unconstrained access rights worry that political debates
crowded with fringe or "spoiler" candidates will distract the public from
its choices among realistically electable contenders.
The issue of equal access to public television debates, as a
constitutional matter, was put to the Supreme Court in 1998 in Arkansas
EducationalTelevision v. Forbes.3 The Court there held that a state-owned
television network had the discretion to exclude a minor-party candidate
from a congressional election debate sponsored by the station. The
predominant response to the decision has been critical, with
some going so
4
far as to argue that Forbes was a complete "catastrophe."
None of the scholarly reactions to date, however, has explored the
degree to which the Court in Forbes was engaged in a "second-best"
enterprise-a compromise attempt to mitigate the difficulties posed by
both open and closed-access systems. Beginning from the assumption that
an open-access model-as a practical matter in the "real world"-would
undermine, rather than advance, democratic discourse about elections, the
Forbes majority opted for a model of bounded discretion for governmental
actors applying professional journalistic norms. Such discretion would be
constrained both by Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
licensing oversight and by particularly searching judicial review of debate
access disputes.
More broadly, Forbes appears to illustrate an overall media strategy
on the part of the Court that seeks to enhance electoral discourse
functionally and structurally with a "checks-and-balances" structure
provided by the counterpoint of public and private media and federal
oversight of state broadcasters. The Court's implicit approach is apparently
designed to provide a realistic media structure that accounts for the
different incentives faced by various types of media. Ideally, such an
institution-balancing structure could suppress the worst excesses of
making recommendations for the mandatory provision of free airtime to candidates by broadcasters.
See, e.g., Lawrie Mifflin, The Backdrop: Crusaderfor Free Airtime Wins a Big Ally, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1997, at A20; Rebecca R. Reed, Free Air Time: Campaign Finance Reform or Constitutional
Violation?, 18 COmm. LAW. 21 (2000).
3
523 U.S. 666 (1998).
4
E.g., Jamin Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1943, 1946 (1999).
Reflecting the observers' substantive visions of appropriate electoral decision-making in a democracy,
a few commentators have endorsed the decision as an appropriate judicial recognition of the
dominance of the two-party system. E.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law Miscellany:
Enforcement, Access to Debates. Qualification of Initiatives, 77 TEX. L. REv. 2001 (1999).
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commercial television while affirmatively allowing public media to play a
gap-filling role where market failures are likely to limit the output of
commercial outlets. Instead of command-and-control regulations designed
to perfect commercial broadcasting, this approach appears to seek
enhanced public discourse by empowering public broadcasters to be
effective competitors to the commercial voice.
Is the Court's approach likely to expand electoral discourse? On the
one hand, the decentralization of public television in the United States and
the fact that Forbes permits discretion, rather than mandating third party
exclusion, suggest that debate exclusion will not become government
orthodoxy. On the other hand, while none is dispositive, there are reasons
to be skeptical about the ultimate effectiveness of the Court's compromise
media strategy.
Ultimately, only future experience with the editorial decisions of
public broadcasters will determine whether the Court's attempt to
substitute bureaucratic and professional expertise for populist access will
achieve its goal of an informed electorate. The important issue then
becomes the sophistication with which the results of such experience are
collected, assessed, and analyzed.
Part I of this Article describes the debate over open access to political
debates and the scholarly reactions to Forbes. Part II explores Forbes as a
second-best alternative with a rational structure of bounded journalistic
discretion. Finally, Part III proposes that Forbes should be read as part of
an overall media strategy characterized by a contrapuntal relationship
between public and commercial television. I conclude by arguing that
although the Court's approach can be challenged by reference to the
commercialization of public television, the FCC's history of deference to
broadcasters, the questionable efficacy of structural guarantees of
independence, and the lessons of the 2000 debate season, Forbes
nevertheless permits an experiment whose effectiveness can be assessed
only over time, on the basis of empirical data for whose collection and
analysis the case should provide an impetus.
I.

The Debate over Open Access to Political Debates

Although arguments for First Amendment-based rights of public
access to the broadcast media have been in the air since Professor Jerome
Barron's seminal article5 introduced the notion, media access claims have6
recently enjoyed a renaissance in the context of political debates.
5
Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1641 (1967).
6
See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 4, at 1952-77; OWEN M. FIss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 9-20
(1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17-51 (1993); Martin H.
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Candidates seeking access to televised debates have made both statutory7
and constitutional8 arguments for free expression and effective political
process. Until the 1990s, however, none of the cases granted candidates a
general right of access to debates under any of the proffered theories. 9 The
general assertion of a First Amendment right of access to the airways had
been addressed and rejected by the Supreme Court with respect to
commercial broadcasters in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee.'o However, until Forbes, the First Amendment status of public
broadcasters had not been addressed specifically by the Court."'
Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive
Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. L. REv. 1083 (1999).
7
Historically, statutory arguments for debate access have rested primarily on the equal
opportunities provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000), and the tax
laws. See, e.g., Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund (Fulani 1), 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989)
(featuring charge by independent presidential candidate in 1988 that the League of Women Voters
should be precluded from staging televised presidential debates because candidate's exclusion
constituted "partisan activity," triggering loss of tax-exempt status). Other statutory claims have been
made as well. See, e.g., Graham Clusen, 427 F. Supp. 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (featuring a claim by a
voter in the 1976 presidential election that networks' decisions to exclude all presidential candidates
other than Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter from electoral debates conspired forcibly to deprive him of
an informed vote under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970)).
In the statutory context, under the Communications Act, courts have held uniformly that
individual candidates do not have standing to bring actions under § 315's equal opportunities
provision. See, e.g., Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423,
1427-28 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 (1994), 514 U.S. 1110 (1995); Belluso v. Turner
Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980); Daly v. CBS, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 85 (7th
Cir. 1962); Lamb v. Griffin Television, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1430 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Maher v. Sun
Publ'ns, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 353 (D. Kan. 1978); Ackerman v. CBS, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 628, 631
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Standing also derailed access claims grounded on the neutrality required by the taxexempt status of the sponsoring organizations, e.g., Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund
(Fulani I), 935 F.2d 1324, 1325-29 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992), as did
substantive findings that exclusion of a candidate from primary debates should not be considered
partisan activity for tax status purposes. E.g., Fulani1, 882 F.2d at 628-30.
Recent versions of the statutory argument have focused on federal election law, arguing
unsuccessfully that the Federal Election Commission's debate regulations are inconsistent with their
enabling statute, that exclusionary access decisions are actually illegal campaign contributions to the
invited candidates, and that debate staging criteria adopted by the CPD do not satisfy the objectivity
requirements of federal election law. E.g., Becker v. FEC, 112 F. Supp.2d 172 (D. Mass. 2000);
Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp.2d 58 (D.C. 2000).
8
See, e.g., Chandler v. Ga. Pub. Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990)
(addressing First Amendment and equal protection claims); Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 164 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (addressing First and Fifteenth Amendment claims).
9
Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd
sub nom. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); see also Arons v. Donovan,
882 F. Supp. 379, 387 (D.N.J. 1995) (suggesting that the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority,
by its programming sponsorship of interactive gubernatorial debates, may have created a limited public
forum in which gubernatorial candidates had a First Amendment right to participate and from which
plaintiff could not have been constitutionally excluded on the basis of viewpoint).
10
412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Court had upheld the constitutionality of a limited statutory right
of reasonable access for federal candidates under § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act in CBS, Inc.
v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
11
Indeed, the Court had only addressed the content regulation of public television stations
in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down an amendment to the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967 prohibiting "editorializing" by noncommercial educational television
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FirstAmendment Claimsfor Access to Public BroadcasterDebates

Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes gave the
Supreme Court the opportunity to address the question of access rights in
the context of state television. Ralph Forbes, a perennial political aspirant,
was a candidate for a federal congressional seat from the Third District of
Arkansas in the 1992 elections. Forbes had qualified for the ballot on the
basis of a relatively small number of signatures of qualified electors.
Having previously campaigned as a member of the American Nazi Party
and the Republican Party, Forbes ran as an independent in 1992. A Klu
Klux Klan member who had successfully managed David Duke's run for
Congress from Louisiana, Forbes had himself unsuccessfully run between
1985 and 1992 for U.S. Senate, Lieutenant Governor of Arkansas, and a
local school board seat. 12 In the course of his 1992 campaign, despite his
later testimony that it would have taken a "miracle" for him to have won
the election, Forbes requested participation in a political debate to be
staged by the Arkansas Educational Television Network (AETN).' 3
The AETN, a state-owned public television network, did not give him
the oppoftunity to participate and Forbes sued. Although he lost in the
district court, the Eighth Circuit held that Forbes had a "qualified right of
access" created by AETN's sponsorship of the debate, and that AETN
must have "a legitimate reason to exclude him strong enough to survive
First Amendment scrutiny.' 4 Applying that standard on remand, judgment
was entered for the defendant after a jury trial.' 5
stations receiving grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting).
12
For accounts of Forbes' political history, see, for example, Associated Press, Arkansas
Runoff Offers Foes at Polls Who Are Poles Apart, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 12, 1990, at A5;
Associated Press, Duke Claims Credit for Shifting Debate to Right in Campaign for U.S. Senate,
BATON ROUGE ST. TIMES, June 11, 1990, at 4D; David S. Broder, A Close Governor's Race in
Arkansas? Longtime Incumbent Clinton to Face Ex-Democrat in Fall Showdown, WASH. POST., May
31, 1990, at AI0; Clay Hathom, An 'Unbelievable' Runoff, Ex-Nazi Faced Black in Arkansas GOP
Race, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 11, 1990, at 7D; John Reed, Forbes Softens Racist Rhetoric to
Gain Votes, ARK. GAZETTE, June 10, 1990, at IA; John Reed & Jim Nichols, Stark Choices in
Arkansas Race, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, June 10, 1990, 1990 WL 4911545; Mike Rodman, Suit May
Affect Public TV Stations: Supreme Court to Rule on Exclusion from 92 Arkansas Debate, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 25, 1998, at 43A; and Leonard Zeskind, For Duke, Just a Start, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1990, at A25.
13
Tr. 162 (R. Forbes), J.A. 100; Forbes Dep. 82, Brief for the Petitioner at 14, Ark. Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996). The Arkansas Educational Television
Commission (AETC) is an Arkansas state agency owning and operating a network of five noncommercial television stations referred to as the Arkansas Educational Television Network (AETN).
Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
14
Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1428
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 (1994), 514 U.S. 1110 (1995).
15
On remand, the district court found that the debate was a non-public forum, and the issue
became whether Forbes' views were the reason for his exclusion. The jury found on special verdict
that the decision to exclude Forbes had not been influenced by political pressure or disagreement with
his views. Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 93 F.3d 497, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1996),
rev 'd sub nom. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, finding
that although the Arkansas Educational Television Commission's
(AETC's) exclusionary decision had been made in good faith, AETC had
opened its facilities to candidates running for the Third District
Congressional seat-thereby making the debate a limited public forum to
which all candidates legally qualified to appear on the ballot for that seat
would have a presumptive First Amendment right of access. 6 The
station's reasons for excluding Forbes-that he was not a "viable
candidate" and that he had "no chance to win"-were found insufficient
under strict scrutiny.' 7 The court deemed the State of Arkansas to have
defined political viability in its ballot access statutes: "Whether he was
viable was ultimately a judgement to be made by the people of the Third
Congressional District, not by officials of the government in charge of
channels of communication."'" Noting that "[a] journalist employed by the
government is still a government employee," the court found the fact of
state ownership determinative in its analysis.' 9 Thus, in Forbes, the Eighth
Circuit held that even if the actual decision to exclude a candidate from a
televised debate by a state entity was based not on his viewpoints but
simply on a characterization of his electoral viability, that decision would
not pass strict constitutional muster because of the vagueness and
subjectivity of the standard used in determining viability.
The Supreme Court, in both the majority and the dissenting opinions,
rejected the notion of a general First Amendment right of access to
political debates for all ballot-qualified candidates.2 ° Beginning with the
proposition that the public forum doctrine should not be mechanically
extended to the "very different context" of public television
broadcasting,2' Justice Kennedy's majority opinion asserted that "[a]s a
16
Id. Cases prior to Forbes had rejected the claim that public broadcasting as a whole
should be considered a public forum. See, e.g., De Young v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628, 632-33 (8th Cir.
1990); Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Kennedy v. FCC (Kennedy 1), 636 F.2d 417
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
By contrast to the Eighth Circuit in Forbes,the Eleventh Circuit had concluded on similar facts
in Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission, 917 F.2d 486 (11 th Cir. 1990), that

neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendments had been violated by a public television station's
denial of debate access to third-party candidates. The Court granted certiorari in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), because of the "manifest importance" of the
case and to resolve the lower court conflict. Id. at 672.
17
93 F.3d at 504-05.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 505.
20
In the absence of congressional commands to "[r]egimen[t] broadcasters" in that way by
exchanging public trustee broadcasting with rights of access, 523 U.S. at 675 (quoting CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973)), the majority was "disinclined to do so through
doctrines of [its] own design." Id. at 675. While the First Amendment may not bar Congress from
imposing neutral access rules for public broadcasting, "in most cases, the First Amendment of its own
force does not compel public broadcasters to allow third parties access to their programming." Id.
21
Id. at 672-73.
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general rule," the inevitability of editorial judgments should protect public
broadcasters from claims of viewpoint discrimination as a result of their
programming decisions.2 2 Broad rights of access for outside speakers
would be "antithetical '2 3 to the journalistic discretion that stations must
exercise "to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations. 2 4
Having dispensed quickly with the possibility that a televised debate
should be classified as a traditional public forum,25 the majority also
rejected the Eighth Circuit's view that it should be considered a limited or
designated public forum. The majority read the designated public forum
precedents as requiring that the government have intended to designate a
public forum, and concluded that a designated public forum is not created
when the government allows selective access for individual speakers rather
than general access for a class of speakers. In Forbes, the Court found that
the AETC debate was not intended to provide general access to all of the
candidates for the congressional seat. Rather, the AETC "reserved
eligibility for participation" in the debate to candidates for the Third
District congressional seat (as opposed to some other seat), and then
"made candidate-by-candidate determinations," selecting from within the
eligible group.26
According to the majority, candidate debates "present the narrow
exception to the rule" that public broadcasting as a general matter does not
lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine. 2' Because of the
exceptional significance of debates in the electoral process and because the
debate is by design a forum for candidates' political speech with minimal
intrusion by the broadcaster, the Forbes majority held that the debate was
a nonpublic forum, from which AETC could exclude Forbes only in the
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, exercise of its journalistic discretion.28
22
Id. at 673. Programming decisions would be "particularly vulnerable" to such claims of
viewpoint discrimination even if the exclusions were "principled" and "rooted in sound journalistic
judgment" because "a broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints
instead of others." Id. at 674.
23
Id. at 673.
24
Id. Citing CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 105, and FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984), Justice Kennedy said that Congress rejected open
access norms for broadcast facilities and that television broadcasters enjoy the widest journalistic
freedom consistent with their public responsibilities. 523 U.S. at 673-74. One of their public
responsibilities is to schedule programming serving the public interest: "Publid and private
broadcasters alike are not only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise substantial editorial
discretion in the selection and presentation of their programming." Id. at 674. Thus, broadcasters have
two intended purposes that distinguish them from public parks and funding for state university student
publications: 1)journalistic purposes, and 2) statutory obligations to provide programming serving the
public interest.
25
523 U.S. at 678.
26
Id. at 680.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 676. Although unlimited access is not feasible in many cases for candidate debates,
the majority opined that "the requirement of neutrality remains; a broadcaster cannot grant or deny
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The Supreme Court majority found that the record supported the
jury's finding that the exclusion was not based on Forbes' viewpoints. The
record evidence reflected a number of claims on the part of journalists at
AETN that they rejected him because he was not a viable or newsworthy
candidate.2 9 The majority found it "beyond dispute that Forbes was
excluded not because of his30 viewpoint but because he had generated no
appreciable public interest.,
Three dissenting Justices-led by Justice Stevens-would have
affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. While the dissent agreed with
the majority that the Constitution does not impose on state-owned
television networks the constitutional obligation to allow every candidate
access to station-sponsored political debates, Justice Stevens contended
that AETC's decision was an exercise of standardless discretion
particularly problematic for a state-owned entity.3 1 For the dissent,
AETN's status as a governmental entity would necessarily increase the
risk of government censorship and propaganda32 with respect to "speech

access to a candidate debate on the basis of whether it agrees with a candidate's views." Id.Viewpoint
discrimination in this context would present "an inevitability of skewing the electoral dialogue." Id.
29
In the lower court, AETN apparently relied on Forbes' lack of political viability as the
basis for his exclusion. At the Supreme Court, the network characterized its decision as based on
newsworthiness. See Brief for the Respondent Forbes at 4, Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998). Not much was made of the change from political viability to newsworthiness as a
justificatory criterion in the Supreme Court's opinion, although the Forbes brief had strongly criticized
the shift as permitting even more unaccountable discretion to be reposed in state actors because of the
broader scope of newsworthiness. See id.
at 17-18.
30
523 U.S. at 682. The editors testified that Forbes was a perennial candidate who had
garnered little public support in past campaigns; that he had not received significant financial support
for his campaign; that he did not have a campaign headquarters or paid, full-time campaign staff; that
he never spoke before large groups or rallies (having declined one of two speaking invitations he
received); that the news organizations did not consider him a serious candidate; and that the AP did not
plan to report his name in the election-night results. Virtually all of these elements were mentioned in
the majority opinion as reflecting the journalistic judgment of the AETN personnel. The Court also
noted Forbes' own characterization of his campaign organization as "bedlam" and his media coverage
as "zilch." Id.
31
As Justice Stevens put it,
Like the Court, I do not endorse the view of the Court of Appeals that all
candidates who qualify for a position on the ballot are necessarily entitled to
access to any state-sponsored debate. . . [However,] [rlequiring government
employees to set out objective criteria by which they choose which candidates
will benefit from the significant media exposure that results from state-sponsored
political debates would alleviate some of the risk inherent in allowing
government agencies-rather than private entities-to stage candidate debates.
Id. at 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32
"Because AETC is owned by the State, deference to its interest in making ad hoc
decisions about the political content of its programs necessarily increases the risk of government
censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of privately owned broadcasters does not." Id. at
689. The dissent noted that Congress initially chose a system of private broadcasters because "public
ownership created unacceptable risks of governmental censorship and use of the media for
propaganda," id. at 688, and that it even attempted to prohibit public stations from editorializing for
fear of such effects.
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33
that plays a central role in democratic government.,
The ad hoc decision of the AETC staff should have been held
unconstitutional, according to the dissent, based on the reasoning of the
Court's parade permit precedents. Those cases had held unconstitutional
rules that allowed public officials to make licensing decisions without
reference to narrow, objective and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority. 4 The dissent would instead have imposed a "modest
requirement" that public broadcasters apply pre-established, neutral and
objective criteria to identify debate invitees.3 5 Had such criteria been
applied, the dissent suggested, AETN's rejection of Forbes' request would
have been suspect.36
Thus, while the dissenting opinion did not specify the selection
criteria itself, it called for public stations to use and adhere to preestablished, neutral and objective criteria to determine who among
qualified candidates may participate in debates-praising such criteria as
"providing the public with some assurance that state-owned broadcasters
cannot select debate participants on arbitrary grounds."3 7

B.

Reactions to Forbes

While a few scholars do appear to support the result in Forbes,38 the
largest, and most vehement, group consists of those critics who support the
33
Id. at 689. The opinion cited CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94
(1973), to demonstrate prior recognition of the distinctiveness of, and particular problems posed by,
public broadcasters. 523 U.S. at 687. Justice Stevens also distinguished FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), on the ground that that case implicated the right of wholly private stations
to express their own views on a wide range of topics that have nothing to do with government. 523
U.S. at 689.
34
523 U.S. at 691.
35
Id. at 694-95.
36
The dissent criticized the majority for its too-easy acceptance of AETN's exclusionary
judgment regarding the significance of Forbes' candidacy, noting that Forbes had been a serious
contender in a prior primary race for the Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor, and that the
network's decision to eliminate him from the debate may have "determined the outcome of the
election." Id. at 684-85. On these facts, Justice Stevens claimed that the Eighth Circuit had rightly
characterized the staff's appraisal of political viability as too subjective: "The apparent flexibility of
AETC's purported standard suggests the extent to which the staff had nearly limitless discretion to
exclude Forbes from the debate based on ad hoc justifications." Id. at 686. In exercising their
subjective judgments, the station employees were free to rely on factors-such as Forbes' relative lack
of campaign funds-that the dissent characterized as arguably favoring inclusion. Id. at 692.
37
Id. at 694.
38
See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 2009. Cf Burt Neubome, Conflicting Claims to
FirstAmendment Rights, 15 TOURO L. REv. 1557, 1563-64 (1999) (arguing for objective access rules
but speculating that the Forbes majority did not wish to foreclose full discussion of public financing of
elections by creating an access precedent that would apply by analogy to election funding); Frederick
Schauer, Principles,Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARM. L. REV. 84, 86-87 & 88 n.12
(1998) (expressing doubts about the Forbes holding vis-A-vis debates, but nevertheless recognizing
that debate access raises the familiar problem of allocating scarce resources between the competing
claims of participatory diversity on the one hand and the actual preferences of audiences on the other).
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open access viewpoint.

9

Lambasting

the majority opinion as "an

analytical mess and a First Amendment catastrophe," 40 opponents interpret
it as placing the Court's imprimatur on government-supported "debate
gerrymandering" and political discrimination.41
Some of the more optimistic Forbes analysts focus less on the debate

question than the more general issue of the Court's approach to the
government as speaker.4 2 Even they, however, are engaged in finding the
silver lining in the cloud--either seeing the opinion as a "near miss" in a
positive doctrinal development, or finding in it the seeds of a new and
affirmative turn in free speech theory. One theorist sees what is important
in Forbes as the intimation of an institution-specific First Amendment
approach to the government's intrinsically content-based enterprises, but
regrets this path as "not fully taken" by the Court for reasons of judicial
methodology and traditional interpretation of First Amendment doctrine.4 3
Another focuses not on the part of the opinion affirming discretionary
government speech, but on the Court's refusal to go further in
guaranteeing complete public broadcaster discretion.44 On the latter view,
the important aspect of Forbes is that the limited right of access to debates
created by the Court's requirement of viewpoint neutrality in debate
selection decisions could extend to constrain private commercial stations
as well, with respect to those managerial decisions that undermine
television's educational function.45 Yet another analyst, while implicitly
39
Jennifer Wright-Brown, Finding Room for Independent Candidates in Light of Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 137 (1999); R. George
Wright, Dominance and Diversity: A Risk-Reduction Approach to Free Speech Law, 34 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1999); Jennifer Dillman, Note, Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. ForbesJournalisticEditorialDiscretion or UnconstitutionalPriorRestraint?, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 331 (1999);
Daniel B. Greenfield, Note, Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes: Ending Debate
on PoliticalDebates, 50 MERCER L. REV. 611 (1999); Sutton I. Kinter Ill, Comment, Enduring the
Reign of Tweedledee and Tweedledum: How the Court Further Entrenched America's Two Party
Duopoly in AETC v. Forbes and How It Can Be Dredged Out, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 257 (1999);
Monica Mardikian, Note, The Forbes Decision: Has the Court Closed the Public Forum on Candidate
Speech?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1069 (1999); James B. Toohey, Note, A Standard With No Moxie,
30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
765 (1999).
40
Raskin, supra note 4, at 1946.
41
Id.at 1945, 1995.
42
See, e.g.,
Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finely and
Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 993 (1998) (describing Forbes as
beginning the "important task" of conceptualizing the government's constitutional authority as speaker
rather than speech regulator or manager); Schauer, supra note 38, at 86 (arguing that Forbes' reliance
on institution-specific ideas-such as the autonomy of journalistic decisionmaking-moved the Court
closer to a workable approach to managing the free speech issues in the government's own
enterprises).
43
Schauer, supra note 38.
44
Owen Fiss, The Censorshipof Television, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1215, 1233-34 (1999); see
also Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999) (suggesting that Forbes' debate exceptionalism may contain the seeds of
more expansive electoral expansionism).
45
Professor Fiss suggests that Forbes and some other recent Supreme Court media cases
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commending the Forbes Court for its recognition of government's
constitutional rights of expression, concludes that the Court does not
46
clearly explain the scope of those rights and their limits.
This Article takes a different tack, adopting a holistic reading of
Forbes in which the Court's doctrinal compromise is explained as a
response to the contending institutional norms of public broadcasting and
political debates. It articulates the second-best reasons for supporting the
Forbes approach, and situates Forbes in a contrapuntal media strategy
whose viability can only be tested by experience and empirical study.
C.

Pros and Cons of Open Debate Access

Critical reactions to Forbes must be placed in the fuller perspective of
the current debate on open access to public-station programming. Despite
the vehemence of the critiques, Forbes is a difficult case because it
involves incommensurable commitments and significant values on both
sides of the equation. Those who seek access equality rely both on speech
values and on norms of participatory democracy to ground their claim for a
rich and unconstrained political conversation. 47 But their opponents as well
could argue against constitutional access rights on the basis of speech
values and the democratic need for informed voter choice in a context of
48
scarce resources.
1.

Pro Open Access

Advocates of open access argue that mandated third party inclusion in
televised political debates both avoids the electoral harms of state
censorship in the political arena and affirmatively benefits the electoral
process in expanding political debate beyond the two-party system. From
the process-protective point of view, access proponents contend that open
show a Court attending to managerial, private censorship as well as state censorship. Fiss, supra note
44, at 1224. Professor Fiss sees Justice Breyer's approach to the First Amendment as "the first hesitant

step toward the recovery of a jurisprudence that sees the First Amendment more as a protection of the
democratic system than as a protection of the expressive interests of the individual speaker"--a turn

away from "the libertarian doctrine that has so dominated the Court for the last twenty-five years." Id.
at 1238. This would involve a recognition that "remedying managerial censorship requires a measure
of speech-abridging state action." Id. at 1237. See also Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and

the Flightfrom First Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer's New BalancingApproach, 31 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 817 (1998) (arguing that Justice Breyer has written opinions that emphasize a balancing of
interests rather than the protection of one interest over another).
46
Bezanson, supra note 42, at 967-68.
47
See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 4, at 1946 (contending that debate gerrymandering violates
First Amendment rights of excluded candidates and "discards basic democratic premises").
48
See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 2009; see also Schauer, supra note 38, at 116
n.149 (explaining that "both Forbes' claims to access and [AETN's] claims to the journalistic
prerogative to deny that access can easily be couched in First Amendment terms").
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debate prevents manipulation of election information by government
agencies that apply vague and standardless discretion to disguise
viewpoint-based decisions inimical to an inclusive conception of
democracy. From the discourse-enhancing point of view, access
proponents contend that third party participation enriches political debate
by providing a real counterpoint to the domination of political discourse by
mainstream candidates and private broadcasters. As demonstrated by
Ralph Nader's indictment of the two major parties as the indistinguishable
"Republicrats," access proponents believe that the spectrum of political
ideas spanned by mainstream electoral discourse misses many important
49
issues.

Although the Democratic and Republican parties have dominated
American politics in the twentieth century, third parties have achieved
some electoral success. 50 Irrespective of this success, however, third-party
candidates have had distinctive effects on the political process as a
whole.5 1 Specifically, scholars argue that third-party candidates perform
agenda-setting, electorally strategic, and symbolically democratizing
functions in elections.52 In their symbolic role, minor party candidates can
49
See, e.g., Ralph Nader, A Real Debate Requires All the Candidates, WALL ST. J., Aug.
25, 2000, at A14; see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO.
L.J. 373, 390-92 (1993) (describing strong incentives for the major parties to resemble each other).
50
While no third-party candidate has won presidential office, independent candidates have
been elected to Congress on occasion and have made even better showings in local and regional races.
See, e.g., J. DAVID GILLESPIE, POLITICS AT THE PERIPHERY: THIRD PARTIES IN TWO-PARTY AMERICA
(1994); MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1296 (1994); EARL
R. KRUSCHKE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1991); Sandor M. Polster,

Maine's King Makes Independence a Virtue, Nov. 30, 1999, available at www.stateline.org; Sunny
Kaplan, Green's California Assembly Victory: Anomaly or Start of Trend?, Apr. 16, 1999, available at
www.stateline.org. As demonstrated by Ralph Nader's candidacy in the 2000 contest, some portion of
the voting public will consistently support minor party alternatives, even in presidential elections. See
also STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA 4 (1996) (showing that third party

candidates have received significant support in American presidential elections).
Third parties have represented nearly every political viewpoint-from the Communist Party on
the left to American Nazi Party on the right. See id. at 5. Some parties-such as the American
Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the Libertarian Party-have shown a long-standing
commitment to a particular political agenda. See KRUSCHKE, supra, at 2. Others-such as the
Progressives or Bull Moose Party of 1912 and the George Wallace American Independent Party of
1968-have emerged as spin-offs from major parties. Still other minor third parties (such as the
Vegetarian Party and the Prohibition Party) have been single-issue organizations. For a directory of
current US political parties, see http://politicsl.com/parties.htm.
51
Much has been written about the roles played by and the effects of third parties in the
American political landscape. See generally ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 50, and sources cited
therein; see also DAVID T. LANOUE & PETER R. SCHROTT, THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE: THE
HISTORY, IMPACT, AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (1991); DANIEL A.
MAZMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1974); WITH THE NATION WATCHING:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES 84
(1979); WILLIAM HASSELTINE, THIRD PARTY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); Keith

Eisner, Comment, Non-Major Party Candidates and Televised Presidential Debates. The Merits of
Legislative Inclusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 973 (1993); Raskin, supra note 4, at 1969-71.
52
See, e.g., Samuel Isacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 681-83 (1998); Schauer & Pildes, supra note 44, at
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encourage voter turnout in an otherwise politically cynical and disengaged
citizenry.53 With respect to strategic electoral effects, minor parties can
split the vote and therefore influence the outcome of the electoral contest
between the major-party candidates (as evidenced by the results of the
2000 presidential contest). 4
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, minor-party candidates can
advance issues to the forefront and demand that the two major parties
address them. Ideas generated initially by third parties often find their way
into the policy platforms of the major parties. Whether to co-opt an
increasingly popular minor-party candidate, to still third-party grumbling,
55
or to make policy changes that reflect the population's shifting views,
major parties in the past have adopted and borrowed from the agendas of
third parties.5 6 At a minimum, the third-party candidate's positions can
serve as a counterpoint-forcing the major parties to refine their positions
in response to those articulated by the minor-party candidate.57
If, the argument goes, third-party candidates can perform such a
variety of salutary functions, then they should be allowed to participate in
the electoral arena to the fullest extent possible. Their absence is
particularly problematic with regard to campaigns for local offices in
which, for example, the private press is not as likely to provide extensive
coverage of the candidates.
2.

Pro Broadcaster Discretion

Opponents of equal-access rights challenge the claimed benefits of
uncontrolled access, point to dangers likely posed by such a plan in
practice, and rely on alternative means to constrain the abuse of
1803 n.5; Eisner, supra note 51; Kinter, supra note 39, at 270-72.
53
See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, FEWER SEE CHOICE OF
PRESIDENT AS IMPORTANT: VOTER TURNOUT MAY SLIP AGAIN, available at http://www.peoplepress.org/june00rpt.htm (reporting on Pew Center's finding that voters are more disengaged than in the
recent past).
54
See, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser, Political Scientists Offer Mea Culpas for Predicting Gore
Win, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2001, at A10.
55
ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 50, at 221; see also Eisner, supra note 51, at 986
(suggesting that the major parties adopt minor-party positions not out of altruism but to put third
parties out of business).
56
Historians contend that among the policies initially put on the political map by third
parties were the direct election of senators, suffrage for women, the graduated-income tax, the notions
of initiative, referenda, and recall, railroad regulation, high standards for civil service, and the
encouragement of labor unions. ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 50, at 8; KRUSCHKE, supra note 50, at
8; Eisner, supra note 51, at 983; see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983)
("Historically, political figures outside the two major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and
new programs; many of their challenges to the status quo have in time made their way into the political
mainstream.").
57
See, e.g., ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 50, at 222 (discussing the impact of George
Wallace's candidacy on the Nixon administration's civil rights policies).
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government power. The principal dangers of a right of access articulated
by courts and commentators consist of cacophony, skewed participation,
insufficient time for elaboration of candidates' views, inhibited and thin
coverage, and reduced audience. Access opponents also worry that the
nation's political discourse would be hijacked by truly fringe concerns.
Finally, these theorists make a slippery slope argument regarding the
possible extension of the right-of-access rationale to public station
programming beyond the category of debates.5"
On this view, allowing every candidate the bully pulpit will either
affirmatively harm political debate or, at the very least, will lead to
massive channel switching by a confused or irritated audience. 9 The
increasing incidence of low voter turnout, the decreasing power of political
parties, the diminishing attention span of the American public (for matters
political or otherwise), and the generalized cynicism bred by generic
distaste for all politicians suggest that we face a political reality far from
the ideal. Access opponents claim that opening debates to all candidates
would reinforce these trends rather than reverse them. Indeed, the
particular realities of the modem media structure may mean that rules
requiring debate inclusion will not necessarily promote the intended
democratic values of political transparency and informed citizen selfdetermination. One of the mechanisms by which mass media merely
simulates political transparency (rather than actually promoting it) is
information overload, which, along with a focus on scandal, tends to
distract the audience. 60 To the extent that this happens with debates, the
meaning and salience of political debates may be minimized over time.
Information/debate overload may cause the audience to tune out.
Especially in crowded fields, debates cannot be staged without
deciding who may participate.6 ' In practice, allowing totally open fora may
Brief for the Federal Communications Commission and the United States at 17, Ark.
58
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 2011-12.
59
See Record at 33, Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (No.
96-779), 1997 WL 664266 (question to Forbes attorney about negative effect of including "Willie
Wacko" in broadcast debate). See Schauer, supra note 38, at 87 (describing how limiting debate
participation "increases the audience and sharpens the debate [although it does so] at the risk of further
entrenching mainstream views against challenges from the outside"); see also NBC News Transcripts,
Meet the Press, Sept. 24, 2000 (quoting William Satire for the proposition that "the difference between
a four-person debate and a two-person debate is the difference between a debate and a beauty
contest").
Transparency,
Political
Stimulate
Media
Mass
How
Balkin,
Jack
60
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/media0l.htm.
Debate experts have argued that including all candidates on a televised debate is often not
61
feasible due to the sheer number of candidates. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, LET AMERICA DECIDE 148 (1995). In 1988, for example, the Amicus Brief of
the Association of America's Public Television Stations points out that approximately 280 people filed
statements with the Federal Elections Commission declaring their presidential candidacies. Of these,
168 actually declared and 23 appeared on the ballot in one or more states. Amicus Curiae Brief for the
Association of America's Public Television Stations, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Public
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well squelch debate. If, for example, a station were to invite all prospective
candidates to the debate in order to avoid restricting speech, speechsuppressive consequences would likely ensue. Most obviously, the time
available for front runners to respond to questions and present their
positions would necessarily be curtailed by the sheer number of
participants in the debate.62 Thus, a large number of participants may
diminish the debate's utility as an electoral mechanism by making it
unwieldy and uninformative.
The presence of alternatives may additionally cause viewers to
conflate the more mainstream candidates by comparison. That is, voters
might underestimate the policy differences between the Democratic and
Republican candidates by contrasting them to third party options. Thus, to
the extent that debates are central to voting decisions, debates that feature
a large number of participants may well lead the audience to make
electoral decisions on the basis of a less detailed
understanding of policy
63
differences between the plausible contenders.
Broadcasting Service, at 15, Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (No.96779) [hereinafter AAPTS Briej]. In the 1992 election, 23 presidential candidates appeared on state
ballots and 21 appeared on ballots in 1996. Id. As for candidates running for other offices, many states'
ballot access rules are relatively simple to satisfy for an affiliated candidate. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 7-7-103(d)(1) (Michie 2000) (providing that only ten signatures are required to run for
municipal office); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 5-112 (West, 2000) (requiring a modest fee in order to
appear on the ballot); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(b)(1) (providing that only 25 signatures are
required to qualify as a candidate for any office). As a result of lenient ballot access requirements,
races among as many as II candidates for a single office were not uncommon in 1996. AAPTS Brief,
supra, at 16.
62
See, e.g., Frances J. Ortman, Silencing the Minority: The Practical Effect of Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 613 (2000); see also Chi. Acorn
v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 701 (7th Cir. 1998).
63

See, e.g., TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, supra

note 61, at 19 (describing how crowded debates can impair the voters' ability to "focus sharply on the
major candidate"). On the other hand, this argument assumes that the major-party candidates would not
change their positions in response to the pressure of the third-party alternatives. Major-party
candidates, particularly for high national office, are often criticized for tailoring their positions and
debate postures to the results of an escalating number of public-opinion polls. See, e.g., Dan Balz,
Bush, Gore Nearly Even, Poll Shows: Stakes High for Three Debates, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at
A1; Richard L. Berke, Voter Tune-Out: Focusing on the Few, Blind to the Many, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2000, at § 4, p. 1; Jackie Calmes, Bush Tries to Score a Few Points After the Bell, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5,
2000, at A28; Peter Sinton, Polling Using the Internet Seeks to Improve Accuracy, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
28, 2000, at BI. Third-party candidates charge that this leads to virtually indistinguishable centrism on
the part of the major-party candidates. One of the effects of including third-party candidates in debates,
then, may be that they would force the major-party candidates away from the middle. In the Gore/Bush
campaign, for example, it is possible that Nader's participation would have led to a more left-leaning
Gore and that Buchanan's participation would have led to a more right-leaning Bush. The rationale for
this is that Gore's concern that Nader would cost him the left wing of the Democratic Party and Bush's
concern that Buchanan would siphon away the right wing of the Republican Party would lead them to
modulate their positions to forestall those defections. These tactical decisions on the part of the majorparty candidates would have the overall effect, proponents suggest, of expanding the spectrum of
political choice for the electorate. Rather than voting for "Republicrats," the American public would
have a real choice to make between Gore and Bush once they gravitated away from the relatively
indistinguishable center and moved toward more distinct ideologies. See Nader, supra note 49. Even
for those who would find this a politically desirable result, however, the specific circumstances of each
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Scheduling multiple debates would not eliminate the problem; that
solution too raises the question of who gets to appear on which debate
stage, when and with whom. Obviously, there would be disadvantages to
debate schedules in which the realistically electable candidates did not
have an opportunity to debate one another. 64 While these disadvantages
may be acceptable at the primary level, they may be intolerable by the time
of the final contest.
Given the ambivalence with which at least some candidates view
debates, an equal-access requirement might ironically permit some or all
major-party candidates to use third party participation as an excuse not to
participate. 65 An incumbent with a strong lead may be reluctant to debate
the front running opponent for fear of the potential effect of "losing" the
debate. Such a candidate could strategically deflect attention from that
issue by justifying his refusal to participate on the ground that he would
have to debate third-party candidates. Political discussion would be
harmed by the reluctance of major-party candidates to participate in
debates with fringe opponents. 66 Even if a debate boycott by major-party
candidates would be less likely today (when the presidential debates are
more firmly institutionalized) strategic use of the access right by
candidates might nevertheless harm public debate.67
Moreover, the prospects of cacophony or First Amendment liability
may move public television broadcasters to choose not to sponsor debates

election, and the number and strength of the third-party candidates, would affect the calculus. If, for
example, there were only one serious third-party candidate rather than two, the major-party candidates'
responses to the third-party hopeful would likely have a different effect than the balance projected in
the Nader/Buchanan scenario described above. With regard to the 2000 contest, we might speculate
that a presidential debate featuring all of the candidates would have mirrored the effect of the Nader
candidacy in siphoning votes away from Gore and ensuring Bush's election.
64
See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 2012-13.
65

TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, supra note 61, at

148 (1995). That a debate on a public broadcasting station is an opportunity for free exposure is not a
reason to discount such strategic behavior. Because public stations are statutorily not permitted to
charge for advertisements by political candidates, all such candidates-whether mainstream or
fringe-have audience access without the potential risks posed by debates.
66
For example, proponents of this view would point to Jimmy Carter's refusal to participate
in a presidential debate with Ronald Reagan in 1980 if independent candidate John Anderson were
included in the event. The end result was that the Reagan-Anderson debate took place, but was "anticlimactic" and drew a much smaller audience than the 1976 presidential debates, probably because of
President Carter's refusal to participate. See THOMAS H. NEALE, CAMPAIGN DEBATES IN
PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION, CRS Rep. for Cong., 93-588 GOV, at 5 (1993); NBC News
Transcripts, Transcript of Meet the Press, Sept. 24, 2000. In another version of the strategic use of
third-party candidates, President Nixon's refusal to debate Hubert Humphrey unless George Wallace
were included in the debate might well be characterized as a strategic ploy to avoid debating. See
NEALE, supra, at 3.
67
In the 2000 presidential contest, Al Gore's last-minute decision to pull out of a Judicial
Watch-sponsored debate featuring all the candidates-after George Bush had earlier rejected the
debate invitation-suggests that major-party candidates in major races may well continue to decline to
debate their less-popular opponents.
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at all. 68 This chilling effect "would result in less speech, not more. 69
There is evidence that such chill is not merely a theoretical possibility: a
"direct result"' of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Forbes was an
immediate retrenchment in some public stations' debate plans.7'
Opponents of generalized constitutional access rights argue that the
touted benefits of equal access do not in fact outweigh the risks detailed
above. They contend that while much can be said about the salutary effects
of third parties in general on our political system, z not all third parties
(nor all third-party candidacies) in fact live up to such high billing.73
Absolutist equal-access opponents thus suggest that the asserted benefits
of third-party candidacies could better be tapped if the debate sponsors
could freely choose which of the independent candidacies would in fact
lead to the desired benefits of policy inclusion, accountability, and
68
Professor Raskin vehemently advocates the open access position, responding to concerns
about cacophony, major-party candidate boycotts, and strategic behavior by arguing that public
broadcasters do not have to sponsor and broadcast debates. Raskin, supra note 4. Yet discretion
proponents would rejoin that the perfect is the enemy of the good, and that Professor Raskin's position
would have the effect of suppressing the very institution-debates-that he finds so central to the
democratic enterprise.
69
Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998); see also
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, supra note 61, at 19, 148
(recognizing that allowing all qualified candidates "may actually undermine the educational value and
quality of debates" and "erode public perception of the legitimacy of the debate process").
70
523 U.S. at 681.
71
The Nebraska public television network, for example, cancelled its scheduled political
debate in the 1996 senate race immediately after Forbes was decided because of its concern over the
obligation to include third-party candidates. Id. The history of the debate exclusion from the equal
opportunities obligations of § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 may itself provide evidence
supporting the majority's concern about a chilling effect. That history is an object lesson in broadcaster
self-censorship. Despite a rich history of political debate in this country, the Kennedy-Nixon debates of
1960 were the first televised debates because of the FCC's interpretation of the equal opportunities
rules of the Communications Act of 1934 at the time. See Commission on Presidential Debates, at
http://www.debates.org. Because any appearances of a candidate-including appearances in bona fide
news events-were then considered to trigger the equal opportunities obligations for the candidate's
opponents, broadcasters shied away from incurring such coverage obligations by simply refusing, inter
alia, to televise debates. The Kennedy-Nixon debates, now credited with having cost Nixon the 1960
election, were only televised because Congress enacted a specific exemption for the telecasts from the
equal opportunities obligations under the statute.
72
See, e.g., Eisner, supra note 51, at 983; see also discussion supra accompanying note 52.
73
As a result of multi-candidate campaigns, the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
Presidential Debates has recognized that allowing all qualified candidates "may actually undermine the
educational value and quality of debates" and "erode public perception of the legitimacy of the debate
process." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, supra note 61, at 19,

148.
Opponents of mandated access also articulate substantive reasons for rejecting the reduction of
time available to the front runners through mechanical accommodations of other candidacies. As Judge
Posner put it in his discussion of Forbes, "what front runners have to say is probably more valuable to
the audience than what the fringe candidates have to say-probably, not certainly." Chi. Acorn v.
Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 701 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, even though major parties
can originate as fringe parties and, regardless of their popularity, contribute ideas and put issues on the
agenda of the major parties, more extensive exposure to the front runners' positions is more useful to
the population as a practical electoral matter: "restricting the speech opportunity of the fringe
candidates might increase the speech benefits of the debate over all." Id.
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progressive change.
This is particularly so as the agenda-setting function of third-party
candidates can be accomplished without providing a debate platform to the
maverick candidate. 4 The Communications Act of 1934 provides a
specific right of "reasonable access" to federal political candidates in
election contests.75 Federal candidates can take advantage of their access
rights under section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934 to
ensure that their platforms are presented to the voting public through their
own political advertisements. This is particularly true now that the FCC
has interpreted its rules implementing section 312(a)(7) as no longer
permitting candidate access to be restricted to the commercial time periods
ordinarily sold by the broadcast stations to commercial advertisers. 76 Thus,
access right opponents could argue that both television and other media
may serve as venues for the ventilation of minor-party candidate political
platforms for federal office without having to ensure the candidates'
participation in televised debates. 7
74
In Johnson, for example, despite the candidates' arguments that "by 1984 the televised
presidential and vice presidential debates had become so institutionalized as to be a prerequisite for
election," Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d at 159, the court concluded that the existing access provisions in
the Communications Act "insure that political debate will not be monopolized by one or a very few
candidates, but that candidates from all points of the political spectrum will be able to utilize the
media." Id. at 161.
75
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000); see also Political Primer
1984, 100 F.C.C.2d at 1479, 1523 (1984); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1944 (1999). Although commercial
broadcasters providing reasonable access to federal candidates under § 312(a)(7) can charge for the
provision of airtime, public stations may not sell time and may only charge facilities at cost. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.621(a), (c), (e) (1999).
76
In re Petition for Consideration by People for the American Way and Media Access
Project of Declaratory Ruling Regarding Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, Memorandum
Opinion & Order, F.C.C. 99-231, 1999 FCC LEXIS 4376 (Sept. 7, 1999).
77
In fact, a close reading of the access-proponent position demonstrates that the point of
third-party access is not simply to ventilate third-party positions publicly, but rather, to use the effect
of the debate itself to enhance the third-party candidacy. In keeping with that approach, access
advocates consistently refer to the positive effect of Jesse Ventura's debate participation on his
gubernatorial success. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 4, at 1964. The value of debate benefits varies
depending on the status of the candidacies represented. For example, assuming two major-party
candidates and a minor-party candidate, only the minor-party candidate would benefit substantially
from her very inclusion in the debate. Thus, while the debate would serve as an occasion for the majorparty candidates to score substantive points or make gaffes that would affect their electoral standing,
the inclusion of the minor-party candidate would give her the additional benefit of unaccustomed
visibility and provide a mainstreaming effect. Indeed, AETC's brief to the Supreme Court in Forbes
makes this point: Forbes' "goal was to gain legitimacy from being seen on the same stage with
candidates who had already gained significant public support." Brief for the Petitioner at 35, Ark.
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
Access opponents might say that the effect of this kind of governmental subsidy is to give a step
up to a candidate who would not otherwise have had a realistic chance of either winning or affecting
policy. Thus, one might argue-as did the Arkansas Educational Television Network in Forbes
itself-that rather than being a reflector of reality, the government would be enhancing or endorsing
the fringe candidate and his viewpoints simply by asking him to participate.
This argument is problematic, however. It depends on the starting point of the analysis. If the
third-party candidate's lower standing is caused by the dominance of the major parties and the media's
exclusionary debate practices, then a mandatory-access rule might be seen as simply leveling the
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Finally, proponents of broadcaster discretion may fear that, once
constitutionally recognized, equal-access rights could not be confined to
the political debate context in a principled way. Thus, the access right
would also threaten public broadcasters' coverage of political campaigns
more generally. Given that broadcasting necessarily entails editorial
choices, public television stations would not be able to carry out their
statutory mandates if the Constitution were read to require open access for
the entirety of the broadcast day.7 8 While for some that may in fact be a
defensible result, it is important to recognize that the decision about access
to political debate entails a more general decision about the scope and
utility of all government-sponsored speech through government airways.
II.

Forbes as a "Second Best" Alternative7 9

Given the conflicting democratic claims of open-access proponents
and opponents, the best way to read the Court's approach in Forbes may
be to see the decision as resting on a prudential recognition of the
significant values on both sides of the controversy. Thus, the Court would
seek a means to avoid the undesirable effects of both extreme openness
and entirely unconstrained discretion in the debate context. Despite the
analytical difficulties with some of the majority's doctrinal arguments,
their conclusion appears driven by a "second best" mentality-predicting
that the results of broadcaster discretion subject to judicial and FCC
review are likely to be better than the alternative.8 °
playing field. Because campaigns today are different than in the past-primarily in their reliance on
electronic media-the traditional benefits of third-party candidacies may well be diminished from what
they would otherwise be if the candidates are not given debate access. In any event, because third-party
candidacies have a good constraining effect on major-party failures, we should seek to magnify that
effect by giving the minor parties more of a platform than they would otherwise have. Simply put, the
government, in selecting candidates for the debate, cannot help but have an effect on any of the
candidacies it selects (and does not select) to showcase. In other words, if the government does not
level the playing field and give the fringe candidate a boost that the majority candidates might consider
"unearned," it will by definition be giving the major-party candidates the benefit of the third party's
exclusion.
78
In analogous contexts, the Court has rejected vagueness-based First Amendment
challenges to broadcast content regulations. For example, in the context of broadcast indecency
regulation, the Court rejected a constitutional vagueness challenge on the ground that specific
itemization of "indecent" language would restrict the field in an unprincipled way, and that vagueness
was necessarily and inherently entailed in any attempt to regulate within this area. Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987). When the Court recognized that
vagueness is endemic to any attempt to regulate, it simply acknowledged this reality rather than finding
that such vagueness required constitutional prohibition.
79
We have no way of knowing the precise intention of the members of the Court who
joined Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority. The argument here is that an interpretation of the
case as providing a second best approach to a perennial problem associated with scarcity explains the
majority opinion's doctrinal difficulties.
80
Professor Schauer has suggested that since "principled" doctrinal approaches to the
government enterprise free speech cases have not worked, the Court is moving-albeit not fully-to a
seemingly less principled, more policy-oriented, institution-specific, approach as evidenced by Forbes.

Professionalism, Oversight, and Institution-Balancing
A.

Staking Out the Middle

There are three plausible approaches to the issue of political
programming by public stations. At least some of the pro-access
arguments detailed in Part I suggest an absolutist access approach,
eliminating editorial discretion (at least in the debate context) and
requiring a substantive right of access to public stations. On this view,
based on populist norms, state broadcasters can never appropriately be
seen as anything but organs of the state (rather than professionals hewing
to independent professional codes). Rejecting the constitutionality of
viewpoint-based state speech, this conception of democracy requires the
state to be a neutral conduit that guarantees equal access to citizen
voices-at least in the electoral realm.
The approach at the other extreme, supported by the pro-discretion
arguments detailed in Part I, would give plenary discretion and full
editorial independence to all broadcasters, including state-owned stations,
regardless of the type of political programming at issue. Such editorial
independence would allow government broadcast stations to make
viewpoint-based programming decisions even in the electoral arena.
Political debates would not be subjected to more searching constitutional
review than any other programming decisions.8
Schauer, supra note 38, at 97. While I agree that the Court's approach in Forbes is policy oriented and
that the majority's recognition of institutional independence in state journalism was critical to the
result in the case, I seek in the following Part to provide an account that explains not only the Court's
reliance on journalistic independence, but also its imposition of limitations on state journalism. I
contend that the Court's doctrinally unwieldy compromise was prompted by the need to achieve what
the Court saw as a workable balance of important but competing interests. On this view, the Court's
Forbes opinion was less a way-station on the road to a fully institution-specific First Amendment
analysis than a way to provide for an admittedly problematic description of bounded discretion.
81
In keeping with the plenary discretion approach, some pre-Forbes lower courts
considering the issue of public broadcaster content regulation had emphasized the inevitability and
necessity of unfettered editorial independence for non-commercial, educational broadcasters. See, e.g.,
Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that public
television stations should not be considered public fora for purposes of rights of access; that editorial
decisions by such licensees should not be seen differently from the editorial decisions of private
broadcast licensees; and that the decisions of state broadcasters to cancel the previously scheduled
airing of a program that they considered controversial for political reasons did not constitute
impermissible censorship under the First Amendment because the states had not prohibited or
suppressed the speech of others, but rather exercised editorial discretion over their own expression);
Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that minor-party presidential and
vice-presidential candidates possess no First Amendment right to be included in televised presidential
debates sponsored by the League of Women Voters that aired over the public broadcasting system and
three major networks in view of a "pervasive" scheme of broadcast regulation and broadcasters' public
trustee obligations, without distinguishing between the public broadcasting system and private
broadcasters, and opining that Congress "knowingly accepted the risk of broadcaster favoritism in
order to promote wider coverage of political news"); see also Amiri v. WUSA TV Channel Nine, 751
F. Supp. 211, 212 (D.C. 1990) (rejecting on First Amendment grounds plaintiff's claim to compel a
station to air certain stories he deemed newsworthy, opining that "no individual may compel a
television station to broadcast that person's views, no matter how true and important they may be," and
recognizing that the station has an "indisputable" right to choose the news it broadcasts and cannot
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The third option is positioned somewhere between the two extremes,
designed to recognize the complex and conflicting role of government
speech, particularly in politics. The Court in Forbes embraced such a
centrist, qualifiedly professionalist, approach: allowing journalistic
discretion, but with the limitation that selection standards be viewpointneutral in the special case of debates. Even the dissent in Forbes took a
middle ground position. Proceduralist rather than professionalist, the
dissent sought to bound broadcaster discretion by objective, pre-selected
and publicly articulated selection criteria.82
B.

Bounded Discretion

While far from perfect, there is reason to see the Forbes majority's
approach as a functional middle ground. Journalistic norms and structural
autonomy do in fact function as real constraints on government
propaganda in elections, and the Court's approach does subject debates to
more searching review. The Court's approach is a not irrational
compromise between the extreme alternatives in this controversy.
1.

Journalistic Norms and Structural Autonomy

The Forbes majority discounted the constitutional significance of
government ownership in the context of public television because of the
necessity of editorial decisions and the unavoidable newsworthiness
judgments made by all journalists; the journalistic, rather than institutional,
loyalties of state-broadcaster editors; and the sufficiency of structural
separations between the journalists/editors and the governmental
infrastructure to safeguard editorial independence. 3 While the Court's
public forum analysis is doctrinally subject to critique,8 4 history, structural
legally be coerced into unwanted expression).
82
Some characterize this proceduralist position as an attempt by the dissent to "finesse" the
substantive issue. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999); see also Bezanson, supra note 42, at 957-58 (characterizing disagreement between
majority and dissent as "in a sense technical only").
83
As Professor Schauer has explained: "In the end it is the institutional character of public
broadcasting as broadcasting, heightened here by the involvement of broadcasting professionals in the
very decision under attack, that appears to have determined the outcome of the case." Schauer, supra
note 38, at 91. See Tushnet, supra note 82, at 1257-62 & n.179 (1999) (suggesting that a less
demanding standard of First Amendment oversight was rationalized in Forbes because of the
autonomy promised by the public broadcaster's adherence to journalistic norms, and analogizing the
Forbes approach to the loose judicial scrutiny provided in Britain to the quasi-autonomous
governmental organization--quango--a governmental organization with decisionmakers applying
professional norms in structures insulated from direct political control).
84
Critics from all sides of the debate have challenged the Forbes majority's public forum
analysis as unsatisfactorily formalistic, categorical, and even tautological in the debate context. Critics
who would have sought a broad application of the public forum doctrine in order to ensure equal and
open access lambast the majority opinion as circular in its application of the doctrine. See, e.g., Ark.
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guarantees of independence, and the effect of journalists' professional selfperceptions intuitively support the claim that government broadcasters
should not be treated in the same way as government regulatory agencies.
To the extent that this is true, it may tip the balance against open access.
With respect to public broadcasters' loyalty to journalism norms, the
Court's reliance on the shaping effect of such norms reflects its belief in
the salience of professional norms in both the public and private
journalism sectors.85 It may also reflect some faith in the neutrality and
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 694, n.18 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding
ironic the fact that the debates' non-public status was established for the majority by the very
standardlessness of the exclusionary decision); Raskin, supra note 4, at 1952-58; Fiss, supra note 44,
at 1231; Schauer, supra note 38, at 91-92, 97-99. From the other side, Professor Lowenstein suggests
that if the Court had not attempted to apply forum analysis at all in Forbes, it would not be in the
position of crafting such an awkward take on the designated public forum doctrine. It was only because
of its desire to require some degree of constitutional exceptionalism for broadcast debates that the
Court applied a version of the public forum analysis that could be subjected to a critique for circularity.
See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 4; see also Bezanson, supra note 42, at 966, n.72 (suggesting that
forum analysis would be irrelevant if the government were acting as speaker rather than regulator or
manager of speech on public property).
For a critique of the Forbes analysis in terms of its effect on public forum doctrine more
generally, outside the context of debates, see for example, Steve G. Gey, Reopening the Public
Forum-FromSidewalks to Cyberspace,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998). For an important interpretation
of the doctrine as an attempt to describe the bounds of government's managerial authority, see ROBERT
C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 228 (1995). See

also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713,1757 (1987).
85
Professor Schauer notes: "We are not surprised by judicial unwillingness to see this as a
stereotypical government censorship case, because the journalist/non-journalist distinction carries far
more cultural salience, to the Court as well as to the public, than does the public/private distinction."
Schauer, supra note 38, at 116. He concludes: "In the end it is the institutional character of public
broadcasting as broadcasting, heightened here by the involvement of broadcasting professionals in the
very decision under attack, that appears to have determined the outcome of the case." 1d. at 91; see
also Bezanson, supra note 42, at 976 (explaining that what makes the government's action quasiprivate and constitutionally acceptable in Forbes is that the Court conceptualizes it as government
employees acting in a quasi-professional capacity rather than simply as agents of a monolithic
governmental viewpoint).
As noted above, Professor Schauer has argued that Forbes shows evidence of the Court partially
embracing an institutionally specific approach that would address government speech claims according
to the character of the institution they involve, and that would lead to different rules and results with
respect to different institutions of government speech. Schauer, supra note 38, at 107.
While there is much to be said for Professor Schauer's institution-specific predictions, it is
unclear whether Forbes should be read to portend such different rules on the basis of institutional
differences generally, or whether the Court adopts an autonomy and professionalism-based metastandard to be applied to all speech involving government institutions. Forbes could be said to focus
on whether the institutions in question are operating under two sorts of constraints: 1) self-regulation
by some sort of professional norms external to the government; and 2) structures of autonomy. On this
view, institutional differences would be attributable to the differential application of these suprainstitutional principles designed to constrain the particular types of self-interest predictably threatened
by the institution being a part of government. Thus, whether speaking of public broadcasting or the
post office, the relevant question would be the degree, in reality, of institutional autonomy from the
state and of self-regulation grounded on adherence to professional norms. To the extent that Professor
Schauer's analysis sees the institution-specific element of the Forbes decision as its reliance on
empirical descriptions of how autonomously government institutions operate in reality, this view is
entirely in keeping with the reading suggested here. The interesting question then becomes how and to
what degree courts can deal with the different available descriptions of institutional reality. In
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objectivity of expertise and professional norms, at least as equally
applicable in both public and private media. Moreover, as is evidenced in
Forbes itself (where the state broadcaster used the Associated Press, an
extra-governmental source, as an expert in the debate selection decision),
private journalistic entities are often involved with and affect public
broadcaster decisions. Justice Kennedy's focus on public broadcasting as
more broadcasting than public "resonates with a considerable amount of
empirical reality. 8 6
While the majority's approach may understate the harms that can
flow from unchecked governmental exercises of editorial judgment, the
dissent's approach effectively puts into question the legitimacy of any
editorial activity by state-owned stations (particularly regarding speech
that plays a central role in democratic government). Such a result would
leave the public entirely at the mercy of private media and undermine the
government's ability to emphasize programming likely to be
underproduced in the commercial market.87
The Court's faith in journalistic independence can be supported by an
argument rooted in sociology and psychology. It is rational to assume that
the modem journalist will by definition see herself in opposition to the
authority structure in which she operates. It is also to be expected that the
broadcast journalist's professional identification will lead to a need for
independence, even if she works for a public station. 88 Thus, whether
working for the state-owned station or the commercial, private network,
the journalist will see herself as a free agent-or at most as part of the
larger community of journalists, rather than as an employee of a
governmental or corporate master. 89
Another argument in favor of editorial independence relies on the
history and structure of public stations. The Forbes majority's detailed
attention to the structure of the AETN and the relationship between the
governmental paymaster and the journalists and editors working at the
stations suggests the importance attributed by the Court to structural
guarantees of independence. 90 Structural realities do promote
articulating the plausible but inconsistent descriptions of the public institutional press, this Article
seeks to point to the difficulty and contestibility of the process.
86
Schauer, supra note 38, at 117. Professor Tushnet has characterized the British quasiautonomous governmental organization-quango-analogously. Tushnet, supra note 82, at 1257-64
87
See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311
(1998) (describing the market failures that characterize commercial electronic media).
88
Anecdotal examples support the prediction, even in the public broadcasting context. See,
e.g., Jacqueline Conciatore, Hundreds Protest for KPFA After Tussle on the Air, CURRENT, July 19,
1999, available at http://www.current.org/rad/rad9l3p.html (recounting conflict between West Coast
Pacifica radio station's staff and national management).
89
Michael Schudson, for example, has explored the way in which journalists use
professional norms in the identification and presentation of news. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE POWER
OF NEWS (1995).

90

See Tushnet, supra note 82, at 1251-53. Professor Tushnet's description of quangos
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independence in the world of public broadcasting.
Public broadcasting in the United States reflects fragmentation and
decentralization.9 1 The complex hierarchy in the public broadcasting
system-not to mention congressional complaints about PBS content and
liberal ideology-suggests that there is in fact significant independence
importantly describes their varying degrees of autonomy and provides examples of different degrees of
autonomy entailed by different sorts of funding schemes. Id. at 1258-60.
91

MARK

YUDOF,

WHEN

GOVERNMENT

SPEAKS:

POLITICS,

LAW,

&

GOVERNMENT

EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 133 (1983) ("The picture of public broadcasting... is one of a substantial
fragmentation of authority, and a significant degree of decentralization and station autonomy over
programming-particularly with respect to programs produced from nonfederal funds. This system is
complex, not simple.").
There are several types of non-commercial broadcast stations, some licensed to governments
and others to private non-profit organizations. Many "public" radio and television stations are
privately-owned community stations operated by non-profit entities. See, e.g., RALPH ENGELMAN,
PUBLIC RADIO AND TELEVISION IN AMERICA, A POLITICAL HISTORY 43-82 (1996) (describing the
Pacifica stations, for example). Many are educational and some focus on religious broadcasting. Randi
M. Albert, A New "Program for Action:" Strengthening the Standards for Noncommercial
EducationalLicensees, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 129, 137 (1998). Other public stations are
licensed to universities, including state-funded colleges. See generally ROBERT MCCHESNEY,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S.
BROADCASTING 1928-35 (1995) (describing the history of public broadcasting and the role of
university radio stations). More directly governmental are the stations licensed to the states or local
governments and operated by special governmental agencies. See, e.g., YUDOF, supra, at 127; Albert,
supra, at 137; see also CPB statistics on funding sources for public broadcasting at
http://www.cpb.org/about/funding/whopays.html.
With respect to funding, sixty-one percent of public broadcasting revenue derives from nongovernmental sources, such as listener and viewer memberships and corporate sponsorship. Id.
Although non-profit broadcast stations have operated in the United States since the 1930s, not until the
enactment of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 did the federal government commit itself to funding
public television. For the history of pre-1967 public broadcasting, see, for example, FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 367 (1984); THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL
TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 21-29 (1967); and THE CARNEGIE
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING, A PUBLIC TRUST 33-35 (1979). The 1967
Act envisioned public broadcasting coordinated between the federal government and local stations. As
such, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting was created to oversee the distribution of congressional
appropriations toward: (1) construction of broadcast facilities; (2) development of "high quality
programming;" (3) networking public broadcast stations; and (4) promoting continuing growth and
expansion of new stations. YUDOF, supra, at 128; see also Cmty. Serv. Broad. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102
(D.C. Cir. 1978). The Corporation for Public Broadcasting in turn established the Public Broadcasting
Service (PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR) as separate networks of public television and radio
stations independent of CPB. PBS and NPR operate as non-profit corporations with memberships
consisting of public stations that receive direct grants from the CPB and also receive any programs
underwritten by CPB or PBS. For a complete breakdown of public broadcasting funding, see
http://www.cpb.org/about/funding.
In addition to structuring the CPB as a non-profit, non-governmental corporation, 47 U.S.C. §
396(b) (1994), the statute creating the CPB established guidelines to protect the independence and
editorial integrity of public broadcasters despite CPB funding of some of their programming. 47 U.S.C.
§ 396(g)(3) (1994); see also YUDOF, supra, at 129; Steven D. Zansberg, Note, "Objectivity and
Balance" in Public Broadcasting: Unwise, Unworkable, and Unconstitutional, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 184, 189-93 (1994) (describing safeguards). Moreover, although Congressional oversight was
required through annual reporting and yearly appropriation processes, government officers and
Congress were expressly forbidden by statute from controlling programming, federal funding
percentages were limited, and the ultimate decision to broadcast federally-funded programs was left to
the local station rather than the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. YUDOF, supra, at 129.
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from political masters. As for the relationship between the federal
government and the local public stations, "[i]n operation, the real power
lies with the local stations, not the corporation.
,92 Indeed,
commentators suggest that the decentralization was specifically designed
to forestall federal control of program content.93
As for local control, state law sometimes explicitly provides some
structural insulation even of governmentally-funded stations.94 Moreover,
the complex and changing relationships among and within the relevant
governments with an interest in public station operations suggest some
leeway for station independence. After all, administrations change, and
relevant oversight structures can often contain contending political forces.
Also, state and local governmental broadcasters are often part of existing
governmental entities, such as school boards, which are more realistically
seen as bureaucratic rather than partisan political organizations. Finally,
FCC jurisdiction over all broadcasters, including state and local entities,
ensures another layer of oversight over the state as licensee.
In sum, public broadcasting has not generally been regarded as a
mouthpiece of the legislative or executive branches.9 5 Rather than being
criticized as government propaganda, public broadcasting has instead been
charged with cultural elitism and, more recently, has been labeled as
promoting liberal, controversial programming beyond the directly political
sphere.9 6 In any event, just as we can catalogue pressures on editorial
92
YUDOF, supra note 91, at 129-30. Even between PBS and the Corporation, PBS has come
out on top. Id. at 130. (For a story of confrontation between the White House and public broadcasting,
see id. at 130-33).
93
William Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implicationsfor Public
Broadcasting, 52 TEX. L. REv. 1123, 1150-56 (1974); Linda L. Berger, Note, Government-Owned
Media: The Government as Speaker and Censor, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 725-26 (1985).
94
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 256.82(3) (1999) (requiring Iowa's public television stations to
have an advisory board on journalistic and editorial integrity and requiring that "[t]he division shall be
governed by the national principles of editorial integrity developed by the editorial integrity project");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4924(i) (2000) (asserting that Kansas public broadcasting council shall have no
regulatory authority over any individual station or its programming); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-3, §
52:27C-84 (West 2000) (making New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority independent of
supervision or control by Department of Public Utilities); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 23-102 (West
2001) (making it a misdemeanor for government officials or their representatives to influence program
content on public broadcasting stations).
95
YUDOF supra note 91, at 125. Professor Yudof has portrayed public broadcasting as a
quasi-free enterprise system, operating with substantial amounts of private sector dollars. Especially in
light of the Nixon administration's challenge to public broadcasting, "there appears to be an
overwhelming sense among the relevant participants that government should not dominate
programming." Id. at 133; see also Fiss, supra note 44, at 1223; cf Monroe E. Price, Public
Broadcasting and the Crisis of Corporate Governance, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (1999)
(describing rifts in public broadcasting). Admittedly, some have criticized PBS as having become the
tool of its corporate advertisers and drifted to the right. See, e.g., JAMES LEDBETTER, MADE POSSIBLE
BY... THE DEATH OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING INTHE UNITED STATES (1997).
96
See YUDOF, supra note 91, at 133-34. "If anything, controversy has centered on the
possibility that an overly independent public television network would become dominated by biased
elites, unfettered by congressional scrutiny ..."Id. at 125. While the observations in the text were
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independence in the public broadcasting context, historians also cite
instances in which private, commercial broadcasters
were subjected to
97
governmental pressure with regard to their coverage.
Finally, the Court's reliance on professional norms of journalism
reflects its faith in the ability of judicial and administrative review to
determine whether professional norms were in fact followed. That, under
the majority's approach, the issue of independence is reviewable-and,
indeed, by a jury-may mitigate some concerns about the Court's
deference to the journalistic decisions of government broadcasters.9"
While some might still argue that despite evidence of independent
journalistic decisions, the Court's faith in professionalism and structural
independence is na]'ve,99 it is important to see the Court as engaging in a
second-best, balancing approach. Perhaps the fundamental policy reason
for not attributing particular weight to state ownership is precisely so that
the state-owned or publicly-supported station would be empowered to act
as a true and viable counterweight to the power of the private commercial
media.'00 In the final analysis, the rationale for the majority's refusal to
differentiate between private and public broadcasters with regard to most
of their programming may be, in part, that the market in information is
bigger than a single entity. Thus, we must look at the overall structure and
recognize that editorial discretion is indispensable in keeping public
stations as a realistic counterpoint to the economically-driven
"censorship"
10 1
that we might expect from private stations.

made in connection with PBS and not state-owned broadcast stations, they are nevertheless useful in
casting doubt on the assumption that government sponsorship will necessarily lead to partisan behavior
by public journalists.
97

See. e.g., LUCAS A..POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

132-33, 139, 140-41, 187-88 (1987) (describing Nixon administration pressure on CBS directly by the
White House and indirectly through affiliates and FCC jawboning); SALANT, CBS, AND THE BATTLE
FOR THE SOUL OF BROADCAST JOURNALISM: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD S. SALANT 71-110 (Susan
Buzenberg & Bill Buzenberg eds., 1999) (describing governmental pressure on CBS); Thomas W.
Hazlett & David W. Sosa, "Chilling" the Internet? Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio
Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv., 35, 47-50 (1997-98) (describing "Nixon's
'Chill').
98
Similarly, although the majority in Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications
Commission, 917 F.2d 486 (11 th Cir. 1990), expressed sensitivity to the concern that its decision to
reject a constitutional right of debate access to public stations might "mandate, authorize or predict
Orwellian state thought-control through selective airing of viewpoints on public television stations," id.
at 489, it found such consequences unlikely because any state attempts to suppress unwanted
expression would lead to judicial intervention under the First Amendment and, in any event, would
threaten a loss of license under the FCC's licensing system. Id.
99
See infra Part III.C.I.
100 See infra Part II.
101 Others might support this approach because of a view that even viewpoint-based
government speech is desirable, so long as there is no government monopoly in the speech market.
See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2000). Thus, it would not
be professionalism but a belief in the appropriateness of government speech that would support public
television taking substantive positions on even contested views of the good.
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Viewpoint Neutrality as Bounding Discretion for Debates

Regardless of its recognition of journalistic and structural
independence, Justice Kennedy's opinion hesitated to give public
broadcasters complete carte blanche in the important context of political
debates. 0 2 The Court in Forbes was not entirely willing to countenance
the possibility that publicly-owned broadcast stations could make explicit,
viewpoint-based, and perhaps even partisan selections. Rather, it cabined
their discretion in that arena with a requirement of viewpoint neutrality.
While those taking a broader, effects-based interpretation of viewpoint
neutrality might criticize the Court's intent-based approach, this criticism
is not entirely justified. The more stringent review called for by the
Court's viewpoint neutrality standard can be thought rationally to provide
some protection against government partisanship without sliding all the
way to non-discretionary 03access. It is also preferable to the alternative of
untrammeled discretion. 1

In the Forbes Court's approach, viewpoint neutrality is a subjective,
intent-based standard. Viewpoint neutrality review distinguishes debate
exclusion based on governmental disagreement with a speaker's views
from exclusion based on ideologically neutral newsworthiness or viability
102 Both the FCC and the multi-state amicus brief on behalf of the Arkansas Educational
Television Commission took the position that the forum doctrine should not apply in the situation at
issue in Forbes because, in that context, the government was a speaker rather than simply the provider
of a venue for private speech. E.g., Amici Curiae Brief of the States of California, Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Ohio Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont and Wyoming, Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
According to this view, when the government is speaker-when, for instance, it invites
contributions from third parties-it is permitted to control its own expression, which includes the
authority to make content-based decisions. Therefore, on this view, that the station has selected from
among the existing candidates for a particular office makes that expression or that selection the
expression of the station's viewpoint about the newsworthiness of the candidates. While the majority
in Forbes did recognize that when governmental broadcasters act in their overall programming day,
they inevitably engage in editorial decisions, the characterization of debates as a "special case"
distinguished the broadcaster's role in that context. The Court thus rejected the full-fledged
"government as speaker" position.
103 Even some Forbes analysts who approach the decision from the point of view of First
Amendment jurisprudence, rather than debate access, question the Court's viewpoint neutrality
limitation on broadcaster discretion. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 42, at 967-68 (arguing that
limitations on when government has to constrain its editorial discretion are left undefined in Forbes);
Schauer, supra note 38 (concluding that the Court did not subscribe fully to an institution-specific
approach in Forbes).
However, one could borrow Professor Schauer's notion of institutionally specific analysis to
justify the Court's approach. Thus, the odd doctrinal result in Forbes may be due to the Court's
attempt to address the contending and inconsistent cultural claims of two different important
institutions-journalism and debates-in their interaction with one another. The broad discretion and
institutional freedom called for by journalism culture would be at odds with the broadly-conceived
debate imperative. The Court's reliance on viewpoint neutrality in debate selection-however subject
to critique as a standard-could be seen as an institution-balancing compromise between the
contending absolute claims of the interacting institutions.
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assessments designed to reflect popular will. The former is constitutionally
impermissible; the latter is acceptable as a viewpoint neutral decision.
Critics of the decision contend that viewpoint neutrality is not an
appropriate litmus test.1 4 They argue on various grounds that
newsworthiness and viability assessments are inescapably assessments
based on viewpoint. 0 5 Thus, they claim that exclusion can never be
viewpoint neutral because exclusion, by definition, constitutes a rejection
of the significance of the excluded candidate's viewpoints. In fact, they see
third party exclusion as an implicit governmental endorsement of the
selected major-party candidates. They further charge that, because
participation in debates can have an impact on popularity and electoral
viability, participation decisions made on pre-debate voter interest have
self-fulfilling results which put the government in the position of
influencing election outcomes and substituting government fiat for
citizens' fully-informed votes. 10 6 In addition, Forbes' critics charge that it
is too easy to manipulate the Court's standard by allowing broadcasters to
couch their viewpoint-based decisions in the language-and behind the
fagade-of viewpoint neutrality.
What is common to all these criticisms of Forbes is that they focus
not on governmental intent in selection decisions, but on the effect of such
decisions. From this point of view, the governmental reason for selection
is irrelevant--exclusion is necessarily a viewpoint-based decision because
all selection and exclusion decisions have an impact on the dissemination
of viewpoints.
104 See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 4, at 1952-57 & n.61; Schauer, supra note 38, at 104-06;
Joel M. Gora, Finley, Forbes and the First Amendment: Does He Who Pays the Piper Call the Tune?,
15 TOURO L. REV. 965 (1999); Fiss, supra note 44, at 1234; see also Brief of the American Civil
Liberties Union and the ACLU of Arkansas at 19, Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666 (1998); The Appleseed Citizens' Task Force on Fair Debates, A Blueprint for Fair and Open
Presidential Debates in 2000 (on file with author); Richard Morin, Are Presidential Debates Too
Exclusive?, May 1, 2000, http://washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/polls/wat/archive/ wat0501O00.htm.
Professor Bezanson reads Forbes as saying that when government expression inhibits
competing speech and monopolizes the opportunity for exchange of ideas, then government expression
should be seen as regulatory and not expressive, and therefore valid only if content neutral. Bezanson,
supra note 42, at 993. However, this does not necessarily work to explain Forbes because such
government monopolization of speech, for open-access critics, should lead not to viewpoint neutrality
as the Court defines it, but to completely open access, which the Court rejects.
105 Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law for Respondent Forbes, at
4; Brief of the Natural Law Party of the United States at 2, Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998); Raskin, supra note 4; Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central
Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49,
56-57 (2000). Similar points were made by the dissent in Chandler v. Georgia Public
Telecommunications Commission, 917 F.2d 486 (11 th Cir. 1990).
106 See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 4, at 1946, 1961-63. For example, participation in the
Minnesota gubernatorial debates is credited by many as having enabled Jesse Ventura's election
despite his independent status and low pre-debate polls. See also Eric Bailey, Campaign 2000: Shut
Out of the Debates, Nader and Buchanan Have Plenty of Company, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2000, at
A13; All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 3, 2000) (comments of Mark
Hertsgaard).
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Rejecting an outcome-oriented test, the Court in Forbes adopted a
narrower conception of viewpoint neutrality in this context. The Court's

intent-oriented standard does not address the ideological consequences of
exclusions from debates. It does not look at the possibility of viewpointskewing effects, nor does it address the manipulability of notions of
popularity and newsworthiness. Instead, it relies on the jury's finding as to
the governmental intent.1 °7 The standard simply focuses on whether the
public broadcaster intended to select the participants in its debate on the
basis of agreement with or distaste for their viewpoints.
The Court's decision to do so is not irrational. Claims that debate
exclusions inherently constitute viewpoint-based discrimination are

extremely broad. Because any access decision will have some effect on the
viewpoints available to the public, an effects-focused analysis ineluctably
leads to an open access proposal. But this focus entirely discounts the
significance of any of the countervailing, pro-discretion arguments.
Adopting such an expansive view of viewpoint neutrality would suggest
that public broadcasters could never properly make editorial decisions that

would result in excluding a candidate's voice in a debate. While this result
might be acceptable to open access proponents, it is inconsistent with the
conception of public stations as free to determine their optimal
contributions to the electoral process.'0 8
107 This, of course, raises the question of whether the finding of viewpoint neutrality should
be based largely on the jury finding. Although the finding of whether the decision to exclude Forbes
was viewpoint-based turned on a factual determination, it was necessarily tied to Forbes' political
opinions. The jury surely understood that a finding of viewpoint neutrality would support the exclusion
of Forbes from the debate. In accepting the trial court's decision to turn the issue over to the jury and
reviewing the jury's findings on the basis of the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is raised
whether the Supreme Court overly limited the review that should be applied to protect unpopular
speakers in First Amendment claims. To bolster his position on the AETN's viewpoint-based
exclusion, Forbes might repeat his claim that someone at the AETN had told him that the station would
run "St. Elsewhere" episodes before it ran a debate with him in it. Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television
Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995
(1994), 514 U.S. 1110 (1995). See Raskin, supra note 4, at 1950.
108 As for the argument that selection is tantamount to an implicit and improper endorsement
of major-party candidates, the bottom line is that the government will have presented or excluded
viewpoints regardless of its selection method, and some effect is unavoidable regardless of the
government action. First, it is unclear that their selection would-or should-be read as such an
endorsement. Why assume that the access to the debate-whatever the subsequent effects of the debate
itself-will be perceived as a specific endorsement by the government of any participant's views? The
problem may be addressed by an announcement at the beginning of the program that the program is
not intended to suggest an endorsement of any candidate and by a subsequent "debate post-mortem" in
which an explicit endorsement or an explicit disavowal can be made by the station. If the worry is that
government exclusion of minor-party competitors will be seen as a governmental endorsement of only
the major parties (rather than a specific endorsement of a particular candidate), skeptics might argue
that viewers are just as likely to interpret the exclusion as evidence of the public's lack of interest in
the competing candidates.
More importantly, one might argue, for example, that giving Forbes the opportunity to appear in
a debate is actually much more of an endorsement of his candidacy than an endorsement of any
particular major-party candidate. Depending on the starting point, one might well argue that
government inclusion of an unpopular candidate who did not satisfy newsworthiness norms is not in
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Moreover, the focus on viewpoint exclusion rather than speaker
exclusion might result in undesirable case-by-case governmental
determinations of the viewpoints of the candidates that were-and were
not-excluded. Ultimately, some selections and some exclusions are
inevitable, particularly in crowded fields, and a clean application of the
effects-oriented approach is unworkable. A broad reading of exclusion as
per se viewpoint discrimination would make suspect any such selection
method.
Finally, the adoption of an open access, public forum approach is not
the only alternative to the adoption of a viewpoint neutrality model for
debates. The other alternative is that debates not be considered
distinguishable from the public station's other programming and not be
required to satisfy viewpoint neutrality standards. Under that approach,
state sponsors of televised debates might be free to engage in viewpointbased editorial decisions, as the Forbes Court reaffirmed they might in
their general programming. This result would be far more distressing from
the point of view of political discourse than a state station's attempt to
select debate participants in a narrowly viewpoint-neutral fashion.1°9
fact a viewpoint neutral decision and should be deemed an endorsement. Campaign 2000 Debate
Panel Defends Barring Nader, Buchanan, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2000, at A3 (quoting co-chair of
commission to the effect that "[o]ur role is not to jump-start your campaign and all of a sudden make
you competitive"). In fact, there is evidence that the support Forbes garnered in his prior race was
based on voter ignorance. Gregg Jones & Ray Minor, Voting for, Backing Forbes Seem to Be Different
Things: Some Shocked at Votes for Forbes, ARK. GAZETTE, June 8, 1990, at 1A (describing voters who
voted based on the placement of Forbes' name on the ballot).
To the extent that legitimizing a "fringe" candidate is viewed as an endorsement of his views,
government would be seen as an endorser whatever its debate selection. Simply by including otherwise
minor and unelectable candidates, the public broadcaster thereby gives them the benefit of a potent
platform for their views. The question then becomes whether government provision of such a benefit
should be interpreted as an indirect sponsorship or endorsement of those candidates-or, at least, of the
legitimacy of their views.
Moreover, the inclusion of only some third-party candidates can have a greater effect on the
prospects of one of the major-party candidates than the other, particularly in elections in which a
plurality is sufficient to win. Thus, relatively greater exposure of candidates appealing broadly to
voters sharing one political philosophy may in fact work in favor of a candidate with a very different
philosophy.
109 Critics suggest that if stringent First Amendment scrutiny had been applied to the
newsworthiness and viability criteria as selection standards, such criteria could not have passed muster.
See Raskin, supra note 4, at 1957-58. However, the Eighth Circuit itself, in Marcus v. Iowa Public
Television, 97 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1996), denied the Natural Law Party candidates' emergency motion
for injunctive relief to compel their participation in the program Iowa Press where the Iowa Public
Television station had scheduled "joint appearances" of Democratic and Republican candidates in each
of Iowa's five congressional districts. Accepting for purposes of the injunction motion that the joint
appearances were debates and that Iowa Press, which is a news and public affairs program, was a
limited public forum for qualified congressional candidates, the court nevertheless found that the Iowa
Public Television station had "a compelling interest, in meeting its public service goals, of limiting
access to newsworthy candidates." Id. at 1144. Moreover, the court concluded that the station's
methods for limiting access to newsworthy candidates were "narrowly suited to achieving this goal" as
well as leaving substantial access to other fora offered by Iowa Public Television. While the court's
analysis is not immune to criticism, the case is cited here to demonstrate that exclusionary debate
outcomes have passed muster even under supposedly strict scrutiny applicable to government
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Of course, arguments can be made on the facts in any given case that
particular selection decisions were not viewpoint-neutral and were only
pretextually based on newsworthiness criteria. Obviously, "subjective"
criteria such as professional discretion and newsworthiness will leave
room for abuse and for pretextual application. Yet, there are evidentiary
checks on such manipulative practices. So long as the viewpoint neutrality
argument is addressed on the facts of the relevant case, rather than being
rejected by definition, courts do have leeway to determine whether to
compel a candidate's inclusion. 1 ° Whether that, in turn, poses a problem
of judicial partisanship is of course a different matter that raises much
broader questions regarding judicial involvement in any aspect of the
electoral process. It also depends on the role of the jury.
C.

The Special Characterof Debates

By requiring viewpoint neutrality in the special context of debates,
the Forbes majority stopped short of treating public broadcasters as
completely indistinguishable from private media entities. It did so because
of the assertedly special character of debates. The Forbes majority
distinguished debates from other public station programming on two
grounds: that "[t]he very purpose of the debate was to allow the candidates
to express their views with minimal intrusion by the broadcaster;" and that
"in our tradition, candidate debates are of exceptional significance in the
Effectively, the Court took the position that debates
electoral process.'
were too important to run the risk of government viewpoint discrimination,
and that they could be carved out of the rest of public station programming
for purposes of more stringent review, not only because of their
importance, but because the broadcasters themselves had already ceded
discretion to the candidates and decided to constrain their own substantive
judgments in the context of debates.
exclusions in a public forum.
110 For example, the Forbes Court could presumably have questioned the findings of fact as
to the exclusion of Ralph Forbes. There was evidence in the record that the dissent interpreted as
viewpoint-based.
Ill Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998). The Forbes
majority found it "of particular importance," id. at 675 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396
(1981)), that candidates make their views known so the electorate may intelligently evaluate the
candidate's personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues:
Deliberation on the positions and qualifications of candidates is integral to our
system of government, and electoral speech may have its most profound and
widespread impact when it is disseminated through televised debates. A majority
of the population cites television as its primary source of election information,
and debates are regarded as the "only occasion during a campaign when the
attention of a large portion of the American public is focused on the election, as
well as the only campaign information format which potentially offers sufficient
time to explore issues and policies in depth in a neutral forum."
Id. at 676 (quoting the Congressional Research Service).
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If debates are not in fact so different from the rest of political
programming in modem elections, then pro-access critics can argue that,
over time, the majority's requirement of viewpoint neutrality should
extend beyond debates-at a minimum into the rest of the public stations'
political programming."1 2 If they have already ceded control to the
candidates, then they should have no further control over the participants.
By contrast, discretion proponents can challenge the focused constitutional
scrutiny of debates and argue that there should be no constitutional
difference between private and public broadcasters even as to debates
because of the inevitable editorial discretion in all programming.
While it is useful to challenge the Forbes majority's unquestioning
debate exceptionalism in the abstract, debates today-and particularly
nationally-televised presidential debates-still do play a different role in
public discourse than ordinary news programming. The Court's debate
exceptionalism serves an important functional role in an attempt to provide
a safety net for government error in the special context of elections.
Debates should be treated differently, because they implicate government
speech in a different way than the typical programming decision and play
an important cultural role in a political world of second-best resources.
I.

The "Exceptional Significance" of Debates

Forbes claims that electoral speech has its "most profound and
widespread impact" through televised debates because the public en masse
pays attention to them, they allow for in-depth issue exploration, and they
do so in a neutral (non-partisan) fashion. Intuition, as well as
commentators, support the Forbes Court's proposition that televised
debates are very significant electorally.11 3 Both political analysts' 14 and
poll respondents' 15 attest to their importance. Many credit Richard Nixon's
defeat in the 1960 presidential election to his less-than-stellar showing in
112
Cf Fiss, supra note 44, at 1233 (suggesting that the requirement should even extend into
the educative programming of private, commercial broadcasters).
113 See, e.g., E.D. DOVER, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN THE TELEVISION AGE 1960-1992
(1994); SUSAN A. HELLWEG ET AL., TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: ADVOCACY IN

CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1992). Exit poll data from the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections
apparently revealed that more voters based their decisions on candidate performance in presidential
debates than on any other single factor. Aimee Howd, Politics Behind Candidate Debates, INSIGHT ON

THE NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, at 20; see also Raskin, supra note 4, at 1943-46.
114 Raskin, supra note 4, at 1944 (pointing out that debates can be helpful to undecided
voters and, especially, to those voters who have an interest in a particular substantive issue); see also
KATHLEEN H. JAMIESON & DAVID S. BIRDSELL, PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: THE CHALLENGE OF
CREATING AN INFORMED ELECTORATE 127 (1988) (reviewing the research and concluding that "the
educational impact of debates is surprisingly wide," and "the ability of viewers to comment sensibly on
the candidates and their stands on issues increases with debates").
115
See Majority of Citizens Taking Online Questionnaire Find Debates Valuable in Voting
Decisions, Oct. 20, 2000, http://www.debates.org/pages/news 17.html.
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the Nixon-Kennedy debates of 1960.16 Courts have even taken judicial
notice that a candidate's participation in debates bestows a competitive
advantage over non-participant peers." 7
Yet the precise character of debate significance has yet to be
scientifically established. And the extent to which different debates-with
different goals, different participants, and in different times and
circumstances-may have different sorts and degrees of significance
further complicates what seems like an intuitively obvious proposition." 8
Thus, critics arguing against significance-based debate exceptionalism can
116 There has been, of course, a rich history of political debates in this country. See, e.g., THE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES (Harold Molzer ed., 1993). Yet the now-famous presidential debates
between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy were the first televised contests. See NEWTON MINOW ET
AL., PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION 52 (1973) (describing how television allowed 75 million viewers to be
captivated by an attractive, younger, tanned and poised Kennedy and to discount Nixon's eight-year
tenure as vice president because of his refusal to wear make-up to disguise his five o'clock shadow and
tense, haggard look); THEODORE WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960, 289 (1961) (quoting
Nixon for the proposition that "[o]ne bad camera angle on television can have far more effect on the
election outcome than a major mistake in writing a speech"); Robert Frazer, Note, Political Broadcast
Regulation in the United States and Great Britain, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 89, n.9 (1991); NEALE, supra
note 66, at 2.
Even after Nixon and JFK broke ground on the televised debate, sixteen years passed before the
next presidential debate was televised, both because of FCC regulations and because the front-running
candidates declined to debate. See. e.g., NEALE, supra note 66, at 3; Susan E. Spotts, The Presidential
Debates Act of 1992, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 561, 563 (1992).
117 Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1989). In
fact, this competitive disability vis-A-vis the other candidates was the basis of the Second Circuit's
finding that Fulani had standing to challenge the tax-exempt status of the League of Women Voters,
the debate-sponsoring entity. See supranote 7 (describing the Fulanilitigations).
118 Characterizations of the effect of media on viewer behavior are treacherous. Some studies
of the effects of viewing televised political debates suggest that they are not likely to influence
candidate evaluations or voting intentions very much. David H. Weaver, "hat Voters Learn from
Media, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 34, 41 (July 1996) (characterizing other studies);
see also Rick Pearson & Monica Davey, 'Feeling Good, 'Rivals Rush to Swing States: Polls Indicate
Debate Didn't Sway Many, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2000, at NI. Apparently, party identification and prior
candidate preference may be more significant than watching televised political debates. Weaver, supra
note 134, at 41. Moreover, saying that outstanding performance in a debate can provide a tremendous
campaign boost while gaffes can be fatal just characterizes debate effects at the extremes. See, e.g.,
Erwin Chemerinsky, Changing the Rules of the Game: The New FCC Regulations on Political
Debates, 7 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1984).
The particular office and the specific nature of the contest are doubtless critical in the role of the
debate. It may well be that presidential debates, for example, are entirely distinct from debates for
other offices (particularly if those debates do not enjoy notoriety for some other reason). Lowenstein,
supra note 4, at 2010. Professor Lowenstein, for example, has suggested that although candidate
debates in presidential elections are doubtless major events, neither evidence nor common sense would
suggest extrapolating a similar significance to other debates. Id.
The styles of the candidates, the format of the debate, and the rest of the campaign are all also
no doubt elements that influence the effect of the debate. Moreover, the role and perception of debates
may change over time; what was spectacular when debates were first televised may become banal and
uninteresting as such contests become de rigueur.
Finally, the social science literature concerns debates that have taken place thus far. To the
extent that those debates have been exclusionary, we cannot rely on that literature to predict the effects
of a broader debate field, especially in non-presidential debate contexts. Thus, extreme generalizations
about the tremendously different and clear effect of debates may lose some of their intuitive appeal
when tested against the complexity of the interactive elements in political campaigns.
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challenge the Court's empirical assumption about electoral impact.
Such critics can also claim that the modem debate does not even
serve the romantic goal of educating the public. 1 9 The degree to which
independent and intelligent evaluation of candidates by voters can actually
take place in a debate culture now saturated with spin doctors, political
pundits, and media handicappers is an important practical question that
may qualify the theoretical utility of debates. Modem candidates all-toooften pattern their personal qualities after what pollsters tell them the
electorate expects, 20 turning debate appearances into scripted,
manipulative campaign commercials. With regard to substantive points,
the candidates are mainly concerned about "winning" the debate, and not
about informing the public.' 2 ' At the same time, the debate context does
not permit vetting or checking of candidates' substantive claims. 22
119 See, e.g., Spotts, supra note 116, at 561. The Forbes majority opinion advances the
notion that "it is of particular importance" that candidates have the chance to make their views known
so that the electorate can "intelligently evaluate" the candidates' "personal qualities" and "their
positions on vital public issues." Ark. Educ. Television v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675-76 (1998)
(quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981)). The reference to CBS, Inc. v. FCC is interesting
not only for the point made in text, but also for the fact that CBS, Inc. v. FCC did not involve political
debates. Rather, the issue there was whether the Congress could constitutionally provide a reasonable
right of access to the airwaves for federal candidates to make their views known. 453 U.S. at 371.
Debates raise some of the same issues, but different ones as well.
120 See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, A Modest Poll Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, § 4, at 5.
Whether or not they allow a reasoned evaluation of personal qualities, political debates can certainly
educate the viewer about the image of the debating candidates; the politician participants' skills in
responding to questions quickly; the attractiveness of the candidates as compared with one another;
and a sense of the candidates' personalities and character (whether or not grounded in reality, but
certainly deriving from the candidates' appearance, voice, style, and demeanor.) For critiques along
these lines, see, for example, NEWTON N. MINOW & CLIFFORD M. SLOAN, FOR GREAT DEBATES 36
(1987); and JOEL L. SWERDLOW, BEYOND DEBATE 13 (1984). See also Howard Rosenberg, The
PresidentialDebate:It's Not What's Said But Media Spin on What's Said, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at
AIO (describing debates as "resonat[ing] entertainment values bleeding through news against the
Muzak of prepackaged rhetoric"); Howard Rosenberg, There We Go Again: Shallow TV Debates, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at FI; Michael Tackett, Candidates Offer Voters Nothing New, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
4, 2000, at NI (describing debates as stagecraft); Roger Simon, So, Let the Debates Begin Already,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 2, 2000, at 25 (describing debates as "theater," "minidramas," "one of
the few moments in which the campaigns pull back the curtains and invite everybody to take a peek at
the artificiality of the process");. At best, the debates provide a means for acquainting voters with the
candidates and giving the viewers the opportunity "to watch candidates' minds at work in
circumstances that are less scripted and controlled than usual." BRUCE BUCHANAN, ELECTING A
PRESIDENT 109 (1991). See also JAMIESON & BIRDSELL, supra note 114, at 126.
121 Spotts, supra note 116, at 564.
122 As a result, the major television networks apparently routinely assign "truth squads" to
investigate candidate claims made in debates. Phyllis Kaniss, Assessing the Role of Local Television
News in Elections.: Stimulating Involvement or Indifference, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 433, 440
(1993). In addition to accountability processes like Ad Watch, the last several elections have seen
changes in news coverage. News programs have increasingly provided candidates with larger sound
bites in which to address the population in their own words. In addition, newspapers especially
undertake continuous issue inventories during election periods. But the fact that news commentary is
an important adjunct and supplement to debates does not mean that the candidate debates are therefore
insignificant.
While we can expect the candidates to some extent to combat one another's points and
characterizations, they will presumably only do so when, and to the extent that, such correction serves
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Nevertheless, the debate is best seen as part of a hortatory effort to
improve political discourse. The fact that these debates allow politicians to
spin their audience and project their preferred persona does not mean that
the public cannot learn something important as a result of the debates.
Even if public response is more visceral than intellectual, and even though
debates do not generally provide adequate time for a nuanced explication
of substantive platforms, viewers still can be affected by debates.
Moreover, even if social scientists still argue over whether debates are
electorally dispositive, today they are still significant as an institution.
And, at least some debates will even be individually significant. The
central role of the presidential debate is established if only by the fact that
between forty and eighty million people tune in, depending on the election.
Even if they do not allow for in-depth issue exploration in the academic
sense, debates do introduce the public to the candidate's expression of his
views of the issues. Depending on the race, the timing, the issues, the level
of audience interest and the personal qualities of the candidates, debates
can indeed have significant, if not determinative, effects on election
contests, or, at least, on issue platforms. By now, the institution of the
political debate has a unique cultural salience.
In any event, it is a mistake to look at debates in a vacuum-the
relevant question should be how informative they are compared with the
other resources of political information available to the public. After all,
with the increasing prevalence of "horse race" journalism 123 and negative
political ads that intentionally "spin" the truth, 124 debates provide the
possibility of candidate rebuttal and give the public an opportunity to see
something different. Indeed, regardless of accuracy, debates may help to
reverse some of the voter cynicism and apathy decried by political
observers. Even if broadcasters have been providing more free time for
candidates to speak their piece to the voters, 25 the debate format does
their own political needs. Moreover, neither debate moderators during the debates nor post-debate
analysis programming is likely to be adequate to identify all misinformation disseminated to the public
by the candidates in the debate. The debate moderator-who often makes himself as unobtrusive as
possible in order to give the floor to the candidates-is not principally there to inform the public
substantively or to point out flaws and problems in any of the debating parties' arguments. As for postdebate debunking of the candidates' statements, there is no requirement for post-debate analysis and,
while such analysis is by now common in presidential debate contexts, such programming is no doubt
much rarer with regard to less significant races. Furthermore, much post-debate analysis is nothing
more than an assessment of "who won the debate," and does not provide an adequate amount of the
kind of non-partisan information that would enable viewers to address the accuracy of statements made
by the participants. See id. at 435-36 (citing studies showing an over-emphasis on the horse-race).
123 See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Instant, EphemeralAnalysis, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at Cl.
124 For criticisms of candidates for increasingly running negative, image-oriented and nonsubstantive advertising, see, for example, Rupert Comwell, US. Elections: Negative Adverts Are
Nasty, But They Have Been Nastier, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 6, 2000, at 13; and Adam
Clymer, Campaigns'Strategies."
Negative vs. Negative, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at AI7.
125 See, e.g., Paige Albiniak & Joe Schlosser, NBC Makes Time for Candidates,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 9, 2000, at 6; Jeff Leeds, Fox Gives Bush, Gore Halfan Hour of Free

Professionalism, Oversight, and Institution-Balancing
provide something new.
Under these circumstances, it is not irrational for the Court to
conclude that debates provide an institution of political discourse that is
too significant to permit the risk that government broadcasters could
indulge in viewpoint-based participation decisions.
2.

The Government's Role as Conduit

Simply noting the importance of debates, however, might not be
doctrinally adequate to distinguish them from the rest of the public
station's broadcast day and insulate their constitutional treatment. Thus,
the Forbes Court relies on the broadcasters' own role in debates to justify
the distinction. Justice Kennedy suggests that a debate differs from a
political talk show, "whose host can express partisan views and then limit
the discussion to those ideas,"' 126 because the "very purpose" of the debate
is "to allow the candidates
to express their views with minimal intrusion
27
by the broadcaster.',

Justice Kennedy's distinction cannot mean that debates are
unmediated by comparison with other kinds of political programming
aired by broadcasters. 28 In fact, critics of the American political scene
have argued that political debates
are no less structured and orchestrated
12 9
than the typical Oprah program.

This distinction breaks down in the face of an increasing number of
political joint appearances, which now take place on talk shows and in
other quasi-entertainment programming.' 3 ° The difference is that debates
are not wholly broadcaster-mediated because the candidates themselves

TV Time, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at Al; Dan Morgan, A Madefor TV Windfall: Candidates Air
Time Scramble Fills Stations' Tills, WASH. POST, May 2, 2000, at Al.
126 Ark. Educ. Television v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998).
127 Id.
128 All staging elements for debates require editorial decisions and have perceptible effects.
The time allocation, the nature of the questions, the order, the issue of rebuttal rights, the
lighting/make-up/clothes, whether an audience is present, and how the show is televised (including the
selection of camera shots, among other staging details), are all elements of a debate that require
editorial decisions by candidates, sponsors, and broadcasters. All of these selections, no matter how
mundane, have effects on the "takeaway" of the program. Networks and commentators have
complained vociferously about "pool" coverage' of important political events because things like
camera angles are substantive editorial decisions that will affect the end product. See, e.g., Wendy S.
Zeligson, Note, Pool Coverage, Press Access and PresidentialDebates: What's Wrong With This
Picture?, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371 (1988). In the 2000 presidential campaign, CBS's split-screen
shots of the candidates in the first presidential debate were criticized by some observers for
inadvertently having given more screen space to Gore than to Bush.
129 See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, Lights, Camera... : It's Not Only What You Say, But How,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, § 4, at 1.
130 Gary Levin, Bush, Gore Work Late Shift for Laughs, Humor May Help Sway Young
Voters, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 2000, at 4D; Talking the Talk: TV Shows Give National Candidates
Valuable Exposure, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2000, at A32.
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control much of the process in televised debates.131 The broadcaster
structures the debate primarily
as a conduit, rather than directly as a
13 2
speaker in its own right.
Thus, what distinguishes the debate format is that the sponsor itself
constrains its own ability to editorialize by allowing contrasting points to
be made, and made by the parties that hold the views. The broadcaster's
intent is to 33step off center stage and direct the audience's focus to the
candidates.
Debate proponents argue that the public gains from such candidatecentered programming. The political debate is, arguably, the one clear
political forum in which the selection, mediation, editing and presentation
of news and political information are not left entirely to the discretion of
the broadcasters. Even if one does not see the press as particularly partisan,
131 Candidates often have the power to influence the structure and format of the contests in
which they will participate. The ability to decline the invitation makes the debate participants
extremely powerful in setting the format and parameters of the debate. Howd, supra note 113, at 20;
Spotts, supra note 116, at 561-66. Indeed, candidates often even have control over the questions asked
(or at least familiarity with the range of questions to be asked). The League of Women Voters gave up
sponsorship of presidential debates when it became clear, in the League's view, that the Committee on
Presidential Debates was allowing the candidates to control too many aspects of the planned debates in
1988. NEALE, supra note 66, at 9. Since 1985, the bipartisan Commission on Presidential Debates,
created by the chairmen of the Democratic and Republican parties, has sponsored the presidential
debates. Spotts, supra note 116, at 563.
132 The Forbes Court notes that the debate is "by design a forum for political speech by the
candidates ... [in which] the implicit representation of the broadcaster was that the views expressed
were those of the candidates, not its own." 523 U.S. at 675.
Despite the critics' charges, the Forbes majority's debate exceptionalism-which is grounded
on who mediates the information-is a rational approach to the quasi-public forum analysis engaged in
by the Court. After all, if at least part of the determination to be made in public forum cases is whether
the government has adopted a conduit or managerial role, then distinguishing between programming
primarily mediated by candidates rather than by broadcast journalists can provide enough of an analog
to justify stricter scrutiny of debates than of traditional news and public affairs programming. In the
cable context, in the Turner Broadcastingcases, the Court rejected the conduit-based common carner
argument about cable and held that the cable medium qualified for First Amendment protection.
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I),
512 U.S. 622 (1994). The Turner Broadcastingcases involved the constitutionality of the "must carry"
provisions of the Cable Act of 1992. In Turner 1, the Court acknowledged the First Amendment status
of cable operators, but remanded the case for further evidentiary hearings. In Turner II, must carry was
upheld as a valid exercise of congressional authority. In so holding, the Court recognized that
selection, editing, formatting, timing and other structural decisions about programming are themselves
decisions about content and constitute "speech." Nevertheless, it found that, constitutionally, cable
operators could be required to carry the signals of over-the-air broadcast stations.
Justice Kennedy used an intermediate standard of review under the First Amendment in his
consideration of the must-carry rules because he did not characterize them as content regulation. He
also employed an antitrust-based form of analysis. Justice Breyer, whose vote was necessary to the
result in Turner II, did not join in the competition-based analysis. Rather, Justice Breyer admitted that
the must-carry rules exact a significant First Amendment-based price in suppressing the cable
operator's expressive decisions, but nevertheless held them constitutional on a balancing theory.
133 For an argument that viewpoint neutrality is fundamentally inconsistent with editorial
judgment, but that Forbes involved selection of speech by others-a decision more oriented toward
publication and distribution than to the government's own expression, see Bezanson, supranote 42, at
959-60, 967.
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one might worry that in the translation and characterization, the nuances of
a candidate's position or response might lose their accuracy, individuality,
and personality. After all, media coverage of politics does have significant
agenda-setting and informing consequences, since the press plays "a major
role in making some candidates, and certain of their traits, more salient or
prominent than others., 13 4 That, in itself, might be enough to suggest that a
political debate is both different from, and a desirable alternative to, more
classically media-controlled news programming. The fact that broadcasters
may choose to air non-debate programming influenced by the structure of
the debate format does not detract from the fact that the debate cedes
broadcaster control to candidates and their handlers.
A governmental role as neutral conduit may be particularly important
in the context of political debates because of what corporate lawyers might
call a "self-dealing" problem. Because the Forbes Court envisioned the
AETN broadcasters as journalists, it did not address the issue of what
might be particularly problematic about government-sponsored election
debates. To the extent that such political debates are enmeshed in the
public's election of governmental actors, then a certain conflict of interest
may arise from government selection of the participants in the competition
for governmental office on the basis of their viewpoints. Elections are the
135
central context in which the public reviews and appraises government.
Of course, this is an abstract point. Sponsoring a presidential debate is not
directly relevant to the selection of a state broadcaster's supervisory board,
even though a gubernatorial debate might be. Nevertheless, sensitivity to
the issue of self interest can explain the Forbes majority's desire to36treat
debates differently than the rest of the public station's programming.
Critics might suggest that the broadcaster should act as a "pure"
conduit when it chooses to host a debate by refusing to participate in the
selection of candidates. The problem with that argument, however, is that
it does not consider the broadcaster's decisions about the specifics of its
134 DAVID H. WEAVER, MEDIA AGENDA SETTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 185-92
(1981); Weaver, supra note 118, at 39.
135 See Bezanson, supra note 42, at 968 ("[T]here is a certain incompatibility between
government's power to take positions on elections and the fact of democratically elected
government.").
136 Some have read Forbes as recognizing editorial freedom of government as speaker so
long as it does not monopolize the market. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 42, at 968 (suggesting that
this is a plausible reading). Thus, Professor Bezanson suggests that Forbes involved "a forum in which
the government's speech choices acquired the force of monopoly." Id. However, the first step in the
assessment of market power is the definition of the market. While Professor Bezanson's interpretation
is plausible, one could also imagine the Court taking a broader view of the market, including
commercial voices, and concluding that the public station should be deemed only a minor participant
in that arena. See Tushnet, supra note 82, at 1245-46 (describing American public television as not
having a "dominating role as a source of news"); id at 1254 (suggesting that the determination of
whether a skewing effect really occurs requires consideration of speech opportunities available in the
nongovemment market).
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role as conduit to be themselves editorial choices. A viewpoint neutrality
standard is thus a compromise between an open-access response to this
conflict and the view that government has an appropriate role as speaker,
even in the debate aspect of the political arena.
D.

Why Not Pre-established,Objective Criteria?

For those critics who accept that some participant selections must be
made in crowded fields, the Forbes Court's case-by-case, post-hoc,
discretionary approach is, nevertheless, too dangerous. Such critics would
be reassured, as was the dissent in Forbes, by objective, neutral, preestablished rules determining debate inclusion. Objective standards would
serve both as guides for broadcaster
behavior and litigation benchmarks
137
for excluded third-party candidates.
Why not take the dissent's approach and adopt a requirement of preestablished, objective criteria for debate inclusion in order to avoid the risk
of government abuse? While pre-established rules have much to offersuch as their potentially constraining effect on abuse of governmental
discretion-a realistic assessment of proceduralist approaches to the
problem of debate access suggests that an essentially arbitrary bright-line
access rule is not likely to achieve the democratic electoral results that the
critics desire. Probably, and ironically, such objective, pre-established
standards would mask the considerable exercise of discretion necessary to
apply the standards in any given case. To the extent that the standards
require the application of select uniform criteria in all contests, they would
run the risk of under- or over-inclusion in any particular case. And, most
likely, they would create an increase in litigation focusing on the technical
and administrative process of selection pursuant to the guidelines.
Three possibilities for an objective standard come to mind: a
numerical standard selected by the broadcaster debate sponsor, a standard
grounded in ballot access, and a non-numerical, but neutral and preestablished, guideline based on newsworthiness. 138 All three possibilities
137 See Fiss, supra note 44, at 1235 (contending that "the duty to use objective, preannounced standards would give the excluded candidate a better chance to prove that his or her
exclusion was arbitrary or, under the rule of the majority, a form of viewpoint discrimination").
138 The dissent's comment in footnote 19 is instructive. It discounts the majority's chilling
effect example by saying that the Nebraska station would not have cancelled its planned debate if it
"had realized that it could have satisfied its First Amendment obligations simply by setting out
particularized standards before the debate." Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
694 n.19 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since the majority had stated that the Nebraska station had
cancelled because of the Eighth Circuit's holding that all ballot-qualified candidates have participation
rights, the dissent must mean that there could be neutral and objective standards that are not based on
ballot qualifications. Although it does not say what they are, it does not require a standard as "open to
third parties and fringe groups" as the citations to the benefits of third-party candidates in footnote 14
might indicate.
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are problematic.
First, simply calling for objective numerical benchmarks does not
routinely ensure an inclusive debate result. Experience demonstrates that
there may well be many minor-party candidates who would seek inclusion
in a televised debate--depending on the office, the stage of the campaign,
and, for congressional elections especially, the number of congressional
districts in the station's coverage area. Certainly, the problem of multiple
candidates would be exacerbated by a ruling that permitted access to
debates.
The possibility of hugely-inflated ballots suggests that the rational
broadcaster that seeks to adhere to the dissent's approach would adopt an
easily verifiable, mechanistic and objective
standard far more onerous than
39
mere eligibility to appear on the ballot.
Indeed, the fear of litigation might well create incentives to set high
inclusion hurdles.1 40 Such standards would deprive the stations of the
discretion to invite minor-party candidates who did not meet the elevated
access standard, but who would otherwise be deemed newsworthy and
interesting. Ironically, the major problem with the dissent's argument is
that it might well disadvantage precisely the sorts of new voices on the
political scene that could beneficially affect electoral politics.
In any event, even if we accept, in the abstract, access proponents'
claims that a debate sponsor's objective access criteria (such as those of
the CPD) should not be set too high, what principled criteria would justify
choosing among other possible, albeit lower, benchmarks? How can
principled selections be made between sets of "objective," or even
numerical, criteria selected by debate sponsors?
Second, while the option of ballot qualification as the objective access
standard has the benefit of administrability and apparent neutrality, it may,
in fact, be as problematic as the "discretionary" editorial judgments about
newsworthiness decried by the dissent. Using ballot access as the standard
may be under-inclusive and arbitrary because there is no principled
139 See Natural Law Party v. FEC Ill F. Supp.2d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 2000). The court describes
CPD's debate criteria as follows:
(1) evidence of constitutional eligibility, (2) evidence of ballot access-a candidate must
have his/her name appear on enough state ballots to have at least a mathematical chance of
securing an Electoral College majority in the 2000 election, and (3) indicators of electoral
support-a candidate must have the support of at least 15% of the national electorate as
determined by five selected national public opinion polling organizations, using the
average of those organizations' most recent publicly-reported results at the time of the
determination.
Id.
140 One could argue in the CPD context, for example, that the group's shift from a more
flexible set of selection criteria in the 1996 debates to the rigid and exclusionary 15% rule could be
seen as a conscious attempt to preclude the problems of access claims such as the ones made by Ross

Perot in the last presidential election. Natural Law Party, Ill F. Supp.2d at 37 (describing the CPD's
prior approach).
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distinction between write-in candidates' ability to contribute to public
debate and that of the ballot-qualified candidates. 141 Ballot-focused rules,
far from eliminating governmental discretion, effectively drive the
discretionary governmental selection underground.142 Given the variation
in the stringency of the various states' ballot access rules, 143 the extent to
which debate access rules will achieve their intended discourseexpanding effects will vary greatly by jurisdiction. Indeed, it is not
inconceivable that a ballot-based criterion for inclusion in debates would,
at least in local races, invite pressure on the legislature to limit ballot
access. And for national contests, discretionary choices will have to be
made about what degree of ballot access will be sufficient to trigger
inclusion in national debates. Thus, the ballot access criterion may be only
illusorily "objective" or "neutral." In this way, the criterion may simply
push some of the discretionary decisions back to their legislative roots
rather than permitting discretion to be exercised by the state broadcaster.
The fact that a ballot access scheme was adopted by an elected
legislature does not give it democratic legitimacy per se if applied to
debate access. There may be good policy reasons for relaxed ballot access
standards that would not apply in the debate context. 44
Government has an electoral role with respect to ballots, debates, and
campaign funding. Both constitutional and policy concerns may dictate
that the government adopt liberal rules for ballot access but, at the same
time, that it be free to distinguish among candidates on the grounds of
viability or newsworthiness for funding allocation purposes. This scheme
is justified by a functional approach that looks at the reasons for
141 See, e.g., Chandler v. Ga. Pub. Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (11 th Cir. 1990).
142 As Professor Jeremy Paul has noted persuasively, the government is necessarily involved
in structuring campaign rules. Jeremy Paul, Campaign Reform for the 21st Century: Putting Mouth
Where the Money Is, 30 CONN. L. REV. 779, 786 (1998) (noting that ballot access requirements "are
themselves an effort to gauge chances of success").
143 In Arkansas, for example, only 2000 signatures are necessary to satisfy the ballot access
requirements. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-7-101, 7-7-103(b)(1) (Michie 1999); see also Katherine E.
Schuelke, A Callfor Reform of New York State's Ballot Access Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182, 183-84
(1989); Leonard P. Stark, You Gotta Be On It to Be In It: State Ballot Access Laws and Presidential
Primaries, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 137, 140 (1997). On why additional objective criteria are
necessitated by the "sham" ballot access rules of some states, see Kinter, supra note 39, at 268-69.
144 The Supreme Court has even upheld some limits on ballot qualification in order to avoid
the distracting effect of "laundry list" ballots. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974) (criticizing
"laundry list" ballots for discouraging voter participation and frustrating those voters who do
participate); see also Bennett J. Matelson, Tilting the Electoral Playing Field: The Problem of
Subjectivity in PresidentialElection Law, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238 (1994). In all likelihood, crowded
debates would distract the electorate, and even undermine electoral efficiency, more than the laundry
list ballot. Id. at 1248. Even if adding a few names to a ballot is in fact unlikely to upset the election
process (a matter now being reviewed in light of the confusion allegedly created by the "butterfly
ballot" in Palm Beach County in the 2000 Presidential election), crowding a debate stage may be more
likely to do so. Id. Moreover, exclusion from the debate by definition causes less harm to the candidate
than ballot exclusion. Id. Thus, it is not irrational to apply more exacting selection criteria for debates
than for ballots themselves. Id.
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governmental involvement at each stage. Therefore, some middle ground
appropriate to the function might be the right approach for debate selection
rules as well.
In any event, there is a complex relationship between questions
regarding the nature of the electoral system and questions related to
participation in televised debates. On one level, we might expect rules
regarding participation in televised debates to reflect the electoral system
as it is. On another level, the rules regarding participation in televised
debates themselves could affect the nature of the electoral system and the
public's perception of the legitimacy of the outcome. However, to the
extent that a debate over the legitimacy of debate access rules is actually a
complaint about the electoral system as it is, it may be more appropriate to
discuss and effect changes in the electoral system directly, rather than
through the indirect medium of rules regarding participation in televised
debates. Moreover, notwithstanding renewed public discussion following
the 2000 presidential election, it remains unlikely that certain aspects of
the electoral system will be modified: the constitutional provisions
regarding the election of the President, including its provisions regarding
the effect of failure to achieve a majority in the electoral college, are one
obvious example.
Third, the fallback position of specific and publicly articulated rules
for gauging political viability or newsworthiness for access purposes,
while avoiding some of the critiques of arbitrary numerical standards,
suffers from flaws of its own.14 Once the door to discretion is opened, the
guidelines presumably lose their "objectivity" and, by some accounts, their
neutrality. A benchmark standard of whether the candidate has "a realistic
chance of success" is harsh, disadvantaging not only new candidates with
no clear track record, but also candidates who would significantly change
the political discourse even if they were unlikely to win that particular seat
at that particular time. 46 An alternative standard of whether the candidate
could "capture the sustained attention of the voters"'' 47 reinjects
discretionary judgments about the public's likely interest unconstrained by
the relative mathematical certainty of electoral plausibility calculations. In
any event, any, some, or all of those criteria can be criticized as not
145 For example, Professor Paul has suggested that such rules first be adopted by the
legislature, with more refined and particular application to be undertaken by independent commissions
pursuant to legislative guidelines. Paul, supra note 142, at 786 (proposing a constitutional amendment
requiring all political candidates to participate in joint public discussions of the issues).
146 See Matelson, supra note 144, at 1248. This is also true for an "objective" standard based
on access to matching governmental campaign funds. Qualification for public financing depends on
having raised a certain amount of money from private sources. This kind of selection mechanism
privileges either the already-popular or those candidates who have significant access to private funds.
This is not necessarily the way to enhance the voice of minority candidates who do not have the benefit
of a strong campaign apparatus and fundraising operation.
147 Cf.Paul, supra note 142, at 783-84.
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"neutral," even if they are "objective." Critics complain that attention to
poll data and electability is self-fulfilling and engages the state in swaying

electoral outcomes. 148 The assessment of the claim of neutrality depends
entirely on one's definition of neutrality.
Most generally, even if we could come up with a laundry list of
objective criteria, how would we pick among them? They could depend on
the contest at issue, the stage of the campaign, or various other triggering
principles. If the criteria are
more numerous than one, the choice among
49
them becomes subjective.
There is no doubt that having some clearly articulated guidelines that
allow the identification both of real contenders and serious "dark horse"
candidates is wise policy. The question is whether, in reality, such
guidelines would be significantly different from the considerations that
journalists would ordinarily employ in addressing newsworthiness
concerns about a candidate. 5 ° Whether mandated by a written formula or
148 See generally Raskin, supra note 4. It does not take a heavily post-modem sensibility to
challenge the "objectivity" of some of the criteria commonly taken to be objective and neutral. For
example, many people and news organizations rely on poll data for all sorts of predictions in election
contests. One might argue that poll data, being quantitative, do not give rise to the subjectivity
problems of general newsworthiness determinations and therefore are the perfect debate selection
criteria. Polls, however, are only as good as the pollsters and their questions. Such data have been
criticized as varying in quality and accuracy. See, e.g., THOMAS E. PATTERSON & ROBERT D.
MCCLURE, THE UNSEEING EYE: THE MYTH OF TELEVISION POWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS (1976);

Kaniss, supra note 122, at 436-37 (1993); The Appleseed Citizens' Task Force on Fair Debates, supra
note 104; Panel Discussion, On the Campaign Trail, BROOKINGS REV., Jan. 1, 1997, at 42, available
at 1997 WL 10193541 [hereinafter Brookings Discussion] (quoting Bill Adams' criticism of 1996
election polls as systematically wrong). In fact, polls have been lambasted for distorting the political
process and diverting attention from policy questions both because of their accuracy problems and
because of their quantitative, horse-race character. Accordingly, even the most quantitative of
elements-statistical analyses of likely outcomes-are far less certain and filled with many more
discretionary elements than would sit comfortably with someone determined to make the debate
selection process entirely mechanical.
149 One can imagine the decision being mechanical-hinging on a variety of choices
depending on various pre-identified factors. If the decision under those circumstances really is
mechanical, however, then it can have all the negative effects of inflexible rules.
150 The dissent's characterization of Forbes' exclusion as "standardless" was based on three
factors: 1) his showings in prior elections; 2) his diversionary effect on the outcome; and 3) the
unequal application of AETN's stated standards. While the dissent's reluctance to rely on a jury
finding of viewpoint neutrality is understandable, Justice Stevens attributed too much evidentiary
weight to the factors the dissent isolated as suspicious.
With respect to Forbes' showing in prior elections, the Court did not address the issue of turnout, the difference between a primary and a general election, or the differences in office between
Lieutenant Governor and U.S. Congressman, or evidence that voters had cast their ballots for Forbes
arbitrarily.
With regard to the dissent's argument that Forbes played a significant role in the campaign as a
"spoiler," it is not uncontroversial to assert that the appropriate vantage point for an assessment of the
seriousness of a candidate is not his own candidacy and electability, but his role in the entire campaign.
Moreover, the "spoiler effect" argument assumes that Forbes' participation would have had the direct
effect of siphoning off votes from the other Republican candidate. Finally, that Forbes' participation
could have had a significant effect is merely another way of saying that his participation would have
added arbitrariness to the result, but does not explain how or why that is a desirable thing.
With regard to the third factor, even though AETN had invited a major-party candidate who had
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simply because of sound journalistic judgment, debate participant
selections would likely focus on things like amount, depth and timing of
news coverage, poll results, media endorsements, and funds raised.
Obviously, manipulation, partisanship, and inclusions based on viewpoint
are impermissible. But it is hard to believe that written guidelines of the
sort suggested would eliminate such dangers.1 51
This argument is not intended to advocate that either legislators or
courts reject the notion of debate participation guidelines. Rather, it should
sound a note of caution about what exactly could be accomplished by such
guidelines beyond the exercise of reasonable news judgment approved by
the majority in Forbes. At a minimum, the dissent's proceduralist
approach is no more satisfactory than the majority's in addressing the
competing democratic arguments regarding open access to debates.
III. The Supreme Court's Overall Media Strategy
Forbes' second-best solution to the issue of debate access can be seen
as one element of a media strategy designed to be assessed on a marketwide basis, across competitive media. The Court in Forbes laid the
groundwork for an analytic method that seeks to achieve optimality in
political debates indirectly-by providing journalists flexibility to create
the right balance of access across media, and by providing for structural
protections to preclude abuse. Because the Forbes discretionary approach
permits-but does not require-third party exclusion, its results need not
be catastrophic even from the point of view of equal access proponents.
Although an anti-populist decision, Forbes in practice may give public
broadcasters the flexibility realistically to provide debates and other
political programming in true counterpoint to the private television sector.
Yet because debates are still exceptional, the extra oversight required by
the Court's approach provides a safety valve in the institution-balancing
media strategy.
Absolute access proponents would of course have much preferred a
constitutional right to the promise of an institution-balancing model. But
short of that, whether the Court's approach will expand access to political
debates and enrich the public counterpoint to commercial television still
remains to be seen. While there are some reasons to be skeptical, only
empirical study of the post-Forbes debate landscape will beg'in to answer
collected even less campaign money than Forbes and was a long shot in the election, campaign money

was only one of the factors used by AETN in its debate selection decisions, and one candidate
inevitably looks like a comparative long shot in any unequal election.
151 One argument in support of pre-established criteria is that "the very construction of a list
of objective criteria would produce an open discussion about the permissible grounds for exclusion."
Fiss, supra note 44, at 1235. It is unclear whether that would necessarily occur and, if it did, what its
effects would be.
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the question.
A. Forbes in Practice-NoGuarantees of Exclusion
While there are strong arguments for the potentially anti-democratic
effects of debate exclusion for all third-party and "maverick" major-party
candidates, it is important for critics to observe that the Court did not
mandate exclusion. It simply permitted the exercise of journalistic
judgment in the selection of debate participants. Moreover, the Forbes
majority took pains to explain that its decision addressed the claimed
First
1 2
Amendment right of access and not legislative assurances of access.
Even if legislative change is unlikely to be immediately forthcoming,
we should not forget that public stations may well use their discretion
under Forbes to include-as well as exclude-third-party candidates.
Indeed, such stations would be free to include the third-party candidates
even if they did not satisfy an "objective," numerical standard like that
adopted for the 2000 presidential campaign by the CPD. Wholesale
critiques of the Forbes outcome are problematic in that they assumewithout empirical evidence-that public broadcasters will necessarily
exclude third-party candidates from debates. Given the permissive nature
of the Court's ruling in Forbes, we need to weigh the claimed harms and
benefits of access in light of historical patterns of debate inclusion by
public stations.
In fact, independent candidates have not faced systematic exclusion
from debates sponsored and broadcast by state entities. They have often
53
been invited to participate in debates on both public and private stations.1
Ironically, the AETN's treatment of Ralph Forbes himself during the 1998
152 With respect to the legislative solution, Congress has for several years contemplated bills
designed to reform political debates. See, e.g., Kyu Ho Youm, EditorialRights of Public Broadcasting
Stations vs. Access for Minor Political Candidates to Television Debates, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 687,
724-25 (2000) (describing such legislation).
However, the difficulties faced by such legislation cast doubt on whether the Forbes majority's
sanguine reference to legislative adoption of access rules could realistically solve the policy issue. Ark.
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998). While some Republicans and
Democrats in Congress might vote for such legislation based on a belief in the role of minor-party
candidates in the political landscape, and some might vote for it in order to be able to use access
strategically (depending on the specifics of the campaign), many legislators would presumably reject
such access rights out of hand because they would have no desire ever to face the problem of sharing
the debate stage with a "fringe" candidate. See, e.g., Matelson, supra note 144, at 1284-85. For similar
arguments, including references to Congressional failure to pass proposed debate reform legislation in
the early 1990s, see, for example, Eisner, supra note 51, at 1017 n. 193; and Youm, supra, at 724-25.
153 Eisner, supra note 51, at 1000-01; Greenfield, supra note 39, at 628-30 (pointing out that
of the public television debates for a variety of offices held by nineteen public television stations or
networks, eleven included all ballot-qualified candidates and only five restricted their debates to major
candidates); Karen Everhart Bedford, Election 98 Projects Zoom in on Local Contests, CURRENT, Oct.
26, 1998, available at http://www.current.org/el/el8l9d.html. Because First Amendment access rights
were recognized by few courts prior to the appellate decision in Forbes, we need not attribute inclusion
to a perception that failure to include was unconstitutional.
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election-in which he was invited to participate in a debate the network
aired-demonstrates that state-owned stations will not necessarily march
in lock-step. 5 4 A simple reference to the CPD's high debate inclusion
threshold for post-primary presidential debates should not suffice to
diminish the significance of historical evidence of inclusion both in nonpresidential and even in presidential debate contexts.
As noted in Part II.B. 1 above, largely because of the fragmentation of
authority and the decentralization of the public television system in this
country, non-commercial station licensees by and large have avoided
serious interference with programming decisions.

55

Moreover, students of

public broadcasting observe that the non-commercial stations' oversight
boards do not actually control their programming and operating decisions;
these observers warn
us not to ignore "the powerful influence of the
' 56
staff."'
professional
In any event, apocalyptic claims about the effect of Forbes should be
assessed in the broad context of available media today. The explosion of
new technologies may reduce, at least to some degree, the need for third
party access to all debates broadcast by public stations. If the contending
candidacies and viewpoints-including debates with third-party
candidates-are available across the media spectrum, in various competing
media, then one might wonder about the necessity of requiring open access
to public station debates. That in turn raises questions about framing a
constitutional norm to do so.

Assessing the issue of access across media-in the "information
market" more generally-of course requires attention to the issue of media
substitutability. Admittedly, at this time, broadcasting is still the single
universal mass medium available for free to all Americans. 15 1 It remains
today "the paramount public medium" at least in part because of its
"unique capacity to create a shared understanding."' 58 Arguments rooted in
154 See David A. Lieb, The Debate May Never Happen, But Ralph Forbes Can at Least
Claim a Minor Victory by Being Invited, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Sept. 4, 1998 at 1, available
at 1998 WL 7442545. Moreover, any conclusions to be drawn from an analysis of debate history must
focus particularly on debates sponsored by public media. Exclusions attributable to the selection
criteria of other sponsoring organizations cannot properly serve to assess predictions about the
behavior of public media entities in their own political debate formats. The key point is that
broadcaster discretion will not necessarily lead to third party debate exclusion.
155 YUDOF, supra note 91, at 133. In fact, the real conflict seems to lie between the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the Public Broadcasting System. The CPB has jurisdiction
over the overall public television programming output, and PBS sees itself as representing the diverse
mix of local stations. Nevertheless, as Dean Yudof points out, neither CPB nor PBS views itself "as an
auxiliary of the government." Id.
156 Id. at 134.
157 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 44, at 1216 (warning us not to overstate the democratic value of
computer-based means of communication at this point).
158 Id. at 1217. Admittedly, precisely what that means is unclear. It is certainly true that a
television program watched nationally injects widely-shared events into popular culture. But the
degree to which it actually creates a "shared understanding" beyond a shared experience is a more
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the market-wide availability of campaign information must therefore
address not only the future potential of new technology to inform voters,
but also the specific reality of what is available today and to whom.
The Internet and e-mail are now much more significant elements of
political campaigning than in the past. 5 9 Many web pages now provide
detailed information about political candidates and even market
themselves to Generation X web surfers who distrust mainstream political
information sources. 60 It is also unrealistic to exclude talk shows and talk
radio, although the effect of talk radio may vary by election.16 ' Large
segments of the American public have access to cable 162 and increasing
numbers subscribe to direct broadcast satellite services.163 Alternative
political programming is increasingly easily available. Moreover, the
decline of the mass audience and the multiplicity of electronic sources
today create incentives for broadcasters to put on full-fledged and
complete political debates at least in important elections.' 64 Thus, the
availability of candidate debates and position statements both on
alternative media and on traditional television expands the political
information accessible to the average voter. That access will doubtless
further expand in the future.
complex issue.
159 See, e.g., Ben Macintyre, The E-Vote is Coming, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 18, 2000, at
Al ; Carolyn Said, Politically Connected: Bush, Campaigns Plug Into Net To Reach Voters, Organize
Volunteers, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2000, at DI; Ryan P. Winkler, Note, Preserving the Potentialfor
Politics Online: The Internet's Challenge to FederalElection Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1867-71
(2000) (discussing the application of election law to the Internet as a political tool).
The Internet now provides much information about the positions and voting records of political
candidates in virtually every contest via web pages designed by the candidates' supporters or
independent groups or individuals collecting information for review. The Internet is also increasingly
mimicking the political coverage of the traditional electronic media. See, e.g., Ben White, Parties'
Nominees Who Are Shut Out of Debates Are Invited to Weigh in on Web Site, WASH. POST, Sept. 25,
2000, at A6 (describing a video-on-demand FreedomChannel.com invitation to third-party candidates
in the 2000 presidential contest to submit videotaped answers to all the questions posed to the major
candidates in the presidential debates). With the development of cyber-debates and town meetings on
the Web, the Internet may increasingly serve as a serious contender to the by-now-traditional televised
political debate. At a minimum, the Interet can permit instantaneous fact-checking in connection with
candidates' debate claims. Glen Johnson, The Boston Debate/Gorevs. Bush Spin Cycle: Surrogatesfor
CandidatesDebate the Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 2000, at A27.
160 Shannon Dinniny, Vote Smart Informs Electoratefrom Remote Montana Headquarters,
CHI. TPiB., Oct. 4, 2000, at C2; Hermione Malone, A Web of Politics:New Sites Target Young Voters,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2000, at B 1.
161 See Brookings Discussion, supra note 148.
162 Television
Bureau
of Advertising,
TV
Basics
2001
(Oct.
2000),
http://www.tvb.org/tvfacts/tvbasics/basics3.html (noting that 68% of U.S. households nationwide
subscribe to cable as of 2000). News reports claim that cable news channels had aired seventeen
debates as of February, 2000. Glenn Kessler, In Debates, Sponsors Can t Lose: Companies Using
PoliticalForums to Promote Own BrandNames, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2000, at El.
163 Direct broadcast satellite penetration was over seven percent as of 2000. Television
Bureau of Advertising, TV Basics 2001 (Oct. 2000), http://www.tvb.org/tvfacts/tvbasics/basics11 .html.
164 Cf Paul, supra note 142, at 789 (making a similar point to support his suggestion that the
electronic media not be compelled to carry the political debates or joint discussions he believes should
be constitutionally mandated).
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B.

The Anti-populist, Institution-BalancingApproach

The Supreme Court's decision in Forbes, when read with other recent
media decisions, suggests the implicit development by the Court of an
overall media strategy reflecting a commitment to institutional balance
across media markets, all under the administrative oversight of the FCC
and subject to judicial review. 165 Such a market-grounded, contrapuntal
media strategy allows for an affirmative role for potentially discourseenhancing government speech without reliance on regulatory, commandand-control regulations designed to enhance the programming of
commercial broadcasters.
A review of the Supreme Court's recent media cases suggests, inter
alia, that the Court seeks to promote a competitive media environment
characterized by institutional balance and the shared norms of private
media. For example, apart from any of their complexities, the Turner cases
teach us that the Court is concerned about ensuring over-the-air
broadcasting for those people who have no cable access. 166 Indeed, in
Turner, the Court upheld the constitutionality of "must carry" rules against
the argument that the market itself would result in cable carriage of viable
broadcasters without governmental intervention and that the only real
effect of the rules would be to167provide government-compelled private
subsidies for inefficient stations.
Just as Turner allows over-the-air broadcasting to continue in the
shadow of cable and other new technologies, Forbes allows the
development of a viable, credible role for professional public television in
the presentation of American politics in electronic media. The Court's
media cases, including Forbes, suggest that rules should be crafted to
enhance the role of public broadcasting as a counterweight to the
economic incentives facing commercial broadcasters in a complex and
changing media atmosphere.
The American public appears to view public broadcasting with
165 Professor Kenneth Casebeer has argued that privatization and marketization of the state
are hallmarks of the Court's constitutional strategy overall. E.g., Kenneth Casebeer, The Empty State
and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of
the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 247 (2000); see also Marie A. Failinger, New Wine,
New Bottles: Private Property Metaphors and Public Forum Speech, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 217
(1997).
Professor Mark Tushnet has explained that the viewpoint discrimination entailed by government
speech may not present a substantial constitutional problem because of political competition, "which
produces a system of public broadcasting that prevents it from becoming 'state television."' Tushnet,
supra note 82, at 1245. The argument in text explores the flip side of this observation. It suggests that
the Forbes approach is a way of enhancing the political role of public television so that such public
broadcasting can provide real competition to the private sector.
166 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC
(Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
167 Turner H, 520 U.S. at 180.
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ambivalence. On the one hand, the public is regaled with numerous
newspaper stories about Congressional pressure for public television
168
station accountability for the viewpoints and stories that they broadcast.
On the other hand, there is also the sense that, apart from the Internet,
public television is the last great (albeit perhaps illusory) hope for the
development of a public political sphere in this country today. Public
television is seen as fulfilling the kind of educational role that many
analysts believe will be difficult if not impossible for private commercial
television stations to satisfy.' 69 The Supreme Court's strategy in Forbes is
apparently designed to foster a viable, competitive public broadcasting
alternative to commercial fare.
However, it is important to note that the Court's role for public
television does not entail a transparent state serving as the conduit for the
political talk of all its citizens. The viability of public television's
counterweight role is to be measured by market-based metrics, such as
audience interest and the journalistic norms designed to capture it. Thus,
this is not a full endorsement by the Court of a positive role for the state
qua state in the construction of electoral discourse. Rather, it is a notion
that state broadcasters using private decisional mechanisms can function as
counterpoints to the electoral coverage of private journalistic
establishments. This is consistent with the Court's recognition of the
appropriateness of permitting
the state as speaker to editorialize in FCC v.
70
1
Voters.
Women
of
League
On this model, the state is not given the role of acting as a direct
168 During the campaign for the 1992 Republican party presidential nomination, Pat
Buchanan railed against the airing on public television stations of Tongues Untied, as an allegedly
indecent portrayal of gay life. See, e.g., Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography,and the
Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1551 (1996); Meredith C. Hightower, Beyond
Lights and Wires in a Box: Ensuring the Existence of Public Television, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 133, 159-66
(1994). There are many more examples of members of Congress and others arguing that if we are
going to fund public television stations, we should not do so as long as they air "indecent"
programming--or at least programming that is not palatable to, and consistent with, family values. A
parallel development is the ultimately successful campaign to include a decency clause in the funding
standards for the National Endowment for the Arts. NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); see, e.g.,
Patricia M. Chuh, Comment, The Fateof Public Broadcastingin the Face of FederalFunding Cuts, 3
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 207 (1995).
169 For example, good children's educational programming is likely to be under-produced by
advertiser-supported commercial broadcasters in the absence of governmental requirements. See In the
Matter of Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, II F.C.C.R. 10,660, 3
Communications Reg. (P & F) 1385 (1996) (imposing children's educational television programming
requirement on broadcasters for that reason); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable
Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of BroadcastRegulation Must Fail,95 MICH. L. REv. 2101,
2134-36 (1997); Chuh, supra note 168, at 208, 217. In fact, that some media analysts criticize public
broadcasting for becoming too commercial suggests the extent to which non-commercial television in
its pure form is viewed as a true alternative to programming on the commercial media. See infra note
91, and sources cited therein.
170 468 U.S. 364 (1984). The Court ruled that a ban on editorializing in the Public
Broadcasting System was invalid.
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conduit for citizens' political discourse. Instead, the state is enabled to be
both a journalistic entrepreneur and a speaker in its own right. Indeed, in
Forbes, the state is conceived as disaggregated into its constituent actors,
whose independence can be ensured by simple structural mechanisms.
This allows state actors to manage public entities as if they were private. It
permits media coverage of politics to be formed by journalistic and
bureaucratic norms, rather than the potential cacophony and inefficiency of
unmediated public access. This empowers private-acting state actors rather
than private citizens.
The effect of applying public forum doctrine in the context of mass
communication would be to subvert the exercise of both governmental
power over media entities and broadcasters' discretion to make editorial
decisions about their programming. After all, once government "property"
is characterized as a public forum, then neither the government itself nor
its agents can prevent the public from engaging in expressive activities
there. Rather than relying on the FCC as an administrative agency to
control
excesses
of broadcaster
speech-suppressive
behavior,
characterization of state broadcasting as a public forum would effectively
license unmediated empowerment of unlicensed, unsupervised, private
citizen speech. Or, perhaps even more likely, it would empower organized
but unlicensed private interest speech. This sort of development might well
have a significant power-redistributive effect, although the precise
contours of such an effect are unclear at the outset.
In opting implicitly to reaffirm CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee17 ' and to reject the application of the public forum doctrine to
public-and indeed state-owned-broadcasters, the Supreme Court
rejected these power-redistributive possibilities. Reaffirming belief in the
neutrality of professional judgments and the safeguarding effect of FCC
review even over state-owned broadcast entities, the majority opinion in
Forbes opted for bureaucracy and professionalism rather than populism. In
that sense, the Supreme Court permitted the government to control and
regulate public discourse pursuant to professionalism norms rather than the
push and pull of private speech actors in the market. Again, in so doing,
the Court rejected any unexamined reliance on purported democracyreinforcing effects of public-forum-required public access.' 72
At the same time, the Court allowed private access decisions to be
constrained by governmental institutions at various levels. The underlying
implication of Forbes is that FCC licensing oversight and judicial review
will serve as a backstop to possible abuses of expressive discretion by
171 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
172 See, Lili Levi, On the Mixed Cultures of Regulation and Deregulation, 38 JURIMETRICS J.
515, 534-37 (1998) (reviewing RATIONALES AND RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC
MEDIA (Robert Corn-Revere, ed., 1997)).
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state-owned stations. This is consistent with prior institution-checking
theories in the Court's other recent media cases. In Denver Area, for
example, the cable operator's discretion to reject access to objectionable
material harmful to children was constrained by the local oversight
exercised over public, educational and governmental (PEG) channels by
local governmental entities. 73 This indicates that the Court does not
envision the governmental entities involved in media as interchangeable.
Rather, the Court's focus on different levels of decisionmaking and
oversight in cases like Denver Area suggests that the Court's structural
model for media recognizes the hierarchy of government.
In addition to FCC oversight, judicial review, and competition from
the commercial sector, state broadcasters may be constrained by entities in
the public broadcast sector as well. A close look at "public" broadcasting
in the United States shows a variety of different types of entities. 17 4 The
different sorts of public broadcasters can thus potentially serve as
balancing counterweights even within non-commercial broadcasting. This
may provide yet another level of structural balance in the Court's scheme.
Some analysts suggest that the profit motivation of commercial
broadcast stations will lead to mainstream programming regardless of
increasing market fragmentation. The economic incentive to capture large
chunks of the audience suggests that there will be some limitations on the
programming liberties that commercial broadcasters may take inconsistent
with the interests of their commercial advertisers. For fear of losing their
advertising revenues, commercial broadcasters are likely to cover political
contests in uncontroversial ways. Public broadcasters, on the other hand,
because they are state-owned or at least partly governmentally supported
and thereby far less reliant on the whims of private advertisers, are seen
has having some greater programming leeway. Decisions like the one in
Forbes may allow state-owned broadcasters-under the watchful eyes of
the FCC and the courts-to provide political programming that might
imaginatively advance electoral discussion.
The regulations of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) impose on
all debate sponsors-including broadcasters-an obligation to stage non-

173 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). In Denver
Area, the Court addressed certain indecency-related provisions of the Cable Act of 1992. One of the
Act's provisions had authorized cable operators to prohibit indecent programs on leased-access and
public-access channels. The cable operator veto was upheld for the leased channels, but found
unconstitutional for the public-access channels. In large part, Justice Breyer's justification for striking
the provision regarding public-access channels was that supervisory boards or managers controlled the
programming on public access channels granted to municipalities. Because such local governmental
oversight would act to screen out indecent material, additional oversight by the cable operator would
be unnecessary. In turn, local government programming decisions would be locally and publicly
accountable.
174 See discussion supra Part lI.B. 1.
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partisan debates pursuant to pre-established neutral criteria. 5 Two things
should be noted in this connection, however. First, the regulations apply
only to federal contests. Second, the requirement of neutral and nonpartisan criteria is not self-defining and could well include non-partisan
professional judgments on newsworthiness and electability. Thus, private
broadcasters sponsoring debates could be applying the same type of
newsworthiness-based professional judgments as the public station
journalists after Forbes. Even though critics fault such standards for being
self-fulfilling and therefore inherently discriminatory against third-party
contestants, they appear to be permissible under the regulatory framework.
To the extent that the pressure points are different for public and
private broadcast stations, public stations can serve to provide political
fare unlikely to appear in the mainstream commercial context. It is
precisely in order to minimize the effect of commercial economic
incentives generally that the public broadcasting system at the federal level
is funded by Congress and designed to produce socially valuable
programming unlikely to be aired by the commercial broadcast entities.
While this might lead one to conclude-as did the Eighth Circuit and the
Supreme Court's dissent in Forbes-thatfringe candidates and small-time
races are unlikely to be featured by commercial broadcasters, the
appropriate conclusion to be drawn from that observation in terms of the
obligations of public stations is not self-evident.
One might conclude that the failures of commercial broadcasting
require the public sector broadcasters to provide full-fledged access to all
candidates (especially those otherwise ignored). On the other hand, to the
extent that such open access may lead to audience confusion and
disaffection over time, doubt can be cast on the future availability and
effectiveness of the political programming designed to be better than the
commercial alternatives.
C.

FunctionalBenefits of the Institution-BalancingApproach

On the one hand, giving state and other public broadcasters discretion
to take newsworthiness into account in their political debate planning
specifically (and their political campaign coverage more generally)
presents the possibility of imaginative and useful political programming
that might not otherwise be made available to the electorate. This
approach, which relies on journalistic flexibility as enabling richer and
more complex political programming, does not, however, guarantee that
what would be available on public channels would in fact feature the
175
thereunder.

Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994) and regulations promulgated
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independent candidate who is not likely to be included in the commercial
networks' political debates. But with discretion rather than a mechanical
access right, public broadcasters, if they so wish, can tailor their political
coverage in ways that might be socially beneficial. What is good about
discretion is that it provides the basis for more extensive, probing and
useful debates in the election context.
For example, it is unwise to talk about political campaigns as if they
were either fungible with one another or, even within each campaign, as if
such fast-moving contests should be seen as single and unchanging
phenomena. Thus, it may be that a multi-candidate debate may be very
useful during primary season when there are a number of unknown
71 6
candidates and the campaign issues are first beginning to crystallize.'
This suggests that different sorts of debate formats will be more or less
appropriate depending on the timing and status of the particular election
contest. Since one debate format is not always preferable to another, the
choice of appropriate format and presentation will necessarily involve
editorial judgment as to the particular circumstances if a reasonable and
discourse-enhancing result is to be reached. Different allocation rules may
very well be completely appropriate for different points in the campaign
and, perhaps, for different campaigns and different offices.
Most significantly, there are a number of different views about what
debates are supposed to accomplish. Among possibilities that come to
mind are informing public discourse more generally; providing people
information for a specific vote; persuading the electorate to vote in a
particular way; enhancing the likelihood of voting by simply engaging the
public in politics; forcing candidates to tackle hard questions; and
providing the electorate another form of entertainment in the form of
political theatre.
Obviously, political debates can accomplish one or more of those
objectives. Different goals may be advanced by different debate formats.
Determinations of newsworthiness about one candidate or another might
well hinge on the debate format and the particular purpose the debate
sponsors wish to achieve in any given debate format. Therefore, unless we
feel that a single conception of the value of debates must be adopted by the
state-in itself a problematic proposition-we might find affirmative
benefit in a structure of public broadcasting that would allow the public
stations to select their debate goals and formats on the basis of their own
editorial judgments in a particular campaign year.
It does little good to respond that this allows the state to have a say in
the structure of our politics. It already does have such a say at virtually
every step, and the imposition of an access regime is simply the adoption
176

See AAPTS Brief,supra note 61, at 27.
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of one kind of preferred politics over another. Giving public stations the
option of making some choices and exercising their creativity in
structuring political discourse is at least likely to lead to a less monolithic
concept of appropriate political discourse than might a simple access
scheme. The history of differential approaches to the inclusion of minorparty candidates in different elections and different stations suggests that
the governmental choices in this regard are not in fact as uniform as might
be feared.17 1 When joined with a recognition that televised political
debates on state-owned television stations are simply one source of
information about a political contest, concerns about the corrosive effect of
the exercise of journalistic discretion by public stations should decline.
After all, the rest of the journalism market will serve as at least some
minimal constraint on invidious discrimination against certain sorts of
viewpoints by public broadcasters in their political debates. The rest of the
journalism market includes not only newspapers and private7 8broadcasters,
but the increasingly popular cable medium and the Internet.1
Ultimately, if there are enough structures of autonomy in place,
allowing public broadcasters the discretion to structure political debates as
they wish may create the possibility for a richer alternative to the political
coverage of the private broadcast networks. Even if public stations will
exercise their discretion in a rather conventional way in the majority of
cases, there is at least the possibility of more adventurous programming in
some venues. Without that discretion, it is likely that access rights would
lead to a diminution in political debates on public stations, and would
thereby minimize the political significance of the one broadcast forum in
which commercial imperatives would, subtly or directly, affect debate
format policy far less than in the commercial television alternative.
Moreover, despite the proliferation of information resources, there are
some hidden but systemic actors currently at work in the transmission of
information through mass media. For example, national election coverage
is on the rise in local station political reporting. 7 9 Because of lack of
resources, however, local stations are merely accepting and airing
candidate-provided material rather than undertaking their own political
reporting. 8 ° These stations, on which many people rely for their political
information, rarely have either the expertise or the resources to engage in
political investigation at the national level on their own. 8' Furthermore, in
addition to the general profit-making goals of private stations, there is at
least some evidence of interference with editorial operations by owners in
177
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See discussion supra Part liA.
See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
Kaniss, supranote 122, at 432-55.
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82

such institutions. 1
More generally, the rationale for public broadcasting in the first place
is the notion that public broadcasters are more likely to provide the kind of
socially worthy programming that the economic goals of the private
stations will not support to any significant degree. The public expects that
the public broadcasters' political programming decisions are made
pursuant to journalistic norms and editorial judgments unhampered by the
commercial imperatives of private broadcasters. If public broadcasters
wish to retain that legitimacy, they must provide a realistic stage for
political debate.
Media coverage of politics has been criticized as merely simulating
political transparency rather than achieving it. 183 On this view, media
hinder true transparency because television values entertainment and is
thus open to manipulation by politicians. Media events and scandals
dominate other forms of political information and discussion, transforming
the meaning of public discourse and crowding out public discussion of
policy issues. Thus, as Professor Jack Balkin has recently put it, the goals
of transparency are defeated by its central mechanisms: proliferating
information, holding politicians accountable for their actions, and
uncovering secrets. 84 This is particularly true with respect to commercial
media.
There are other structural constraints on the various forms of publicly
owned or supported media. Thus, on this view, diversity of coverage
would be needed to avoid the cascade effect in newsworthiness decisions.
Obviously, one means of trying to achieve such diversity of political
coverage is for all media to create institution-specific structures that would
generate such diversity. 85 An additional means, however, is to create
contrapuntal structures within the media world as a whole. The Supreme
Court's decision in Forbes can be seen as part of a media strategy that will
promote this. As a result of these constraints on the private media
(including election coverage), and because a full-fledged access right to
public media is probably unworkable, allowing public broadcasters the
possibility of providing counterweights in political coverage may be

182 Examples can be seen in some of the FCC's cases involving claims of impermissible
news distortion. See, e.g., Lili Levi, Reporting the Official Truth: The Revival of the FCC's News
DistortionPolicy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1015-31 (2001) (citing relevant cases).
183 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 60.
184

Id.

185

Id.

Professionalism, Oversight, and Institution-Balancing
186
desirable as a practical matter.

186 Professor Fiss has recently sketched an argument that the entanglement of the state with
commercial broadcasting would provide "reason to believe, or at least to hope, that the duties Stevens
and Kennedy crafted in the public broadcasting context may, in time, be extended to the television
industry as a whole." Fiss, supra note 44, at 1236. However, Forbes' analytic structure suggests that
the Court is less interested in conflating the public and the private in media than in structuring an
overarching media policy based on checks-and-balances and subject to oversight by the FCC and the
courts.
While two Justices would have found state action in CBS. Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973)-the only case specifically to address the issue in the context of
holding that the First Amendment did not guarantee a generalized right of access to the broadcast
media-four expressed the view that there was no state action in the decisions of private broadcasters
not to accept anti-war editorializing advertisements and three thought they did not need to reach the
issue. Most of the lower court cases addressing the matter have concluded that commercial
broadcasters are not instrumentalities of the government for First Amendment purposes. See, e.g.,
DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 1999); Belluso v. Tumer Comm. Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th
Cir. 1980); Kuzco v. W. Conn. Broad. Co., 566 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1977); Mass. Universalist
Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (lst Cir. 1950); Mclntire v. William Penn Broad.
Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1945); Moro v. Telamundo Incorporato, 387 F. Supp. 920 (D.P.R. 1974);
Smothers v. CBS, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp 799, 80304 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Those decisions are consistent with the general doctrine that the existence of even
a pervasive set of governmental regulations does not automatically transform a regulated entity into a
government instrumentality. See, e.g., Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Admittedly, such generalities do not adequately address either the complexity of the state action
doctrine or its application in contexts involving commercial broadcasting. Yet, the Forbes Court's
approach to the First Amendment analysis makes it unlikely that the Court would accept a claim that
there should be a close case-by-case review of claims of state action even in the context of "private
commercial broadcasting." By emphasizing the ordinarily high degree of journalistic discretion
reposed in public broadcasters as being no different from the discretion left to private broadcasters, the
Court's opinion in Forbes reaffirmed what had come to be the received understanding that CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee had effectively foreclosed a successful public forum argument for
private broadcaster programming decisions. See Levi, supra note 172, at 534-37. Taking as a given
that private broadcasters have broad editorial discretion, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion used the
commercial broadcaster as the comparison point-a strategy which permitted the majority opinion to
argue for editorial discretion in the public broadcasting context as well. One of the majority's
arguments for the proposition that private broadcasters should not be considered state actors was the
fact that the Communications Act of 1934 leaves significant discretion to the broadcaster and does not
mandate either total government control or common carrier status. The majority opinion in Forbes
took for granted the proposition that private commercial broadcasters-although licensed by the
government and significantly regulated by the FCC-nevertheless would have complete discretion in
their editorial decision-making without threat of First Amendment scrutiny.
Even the Forbes dissent, in relying on the distinguishing importance of state ownership,
implicitly agreed with the majority's treatment of the private, commercial broadcaster. Justice Stevens
emphasized that Congress initially chose a system of private broadcasters, rather than a Continental
model of state ownership, because "public ownership created unacceptable risks of governmental
censorship and the use of the media for propaganda." Ark. Educ. Television v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
688 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The contrast between private and public broadcasters was clear for
the dissent: Because AETC is owned by the state, deference to the station's interest "in making ad hoc
decisions about the political content of its programs necessarily increases the risk of government
censorship and propaganda in a way that private broadcasters do not." Id. at 689.
The Court in Forbes did not take an available opportunity to revisit the question of state action
(and the applicability of the First Amendment) in the private broadcaster context. At best, in
distinguishing debates from the rest of the public broadcaster's programming for purposes of the
viewpoint neutrality requirement, the Forbes majority simply recognized a particularly important
aspect of political programming that must be protected from state censorship. Nowhere in Forbes did
either the majority or the dissent extend the concern about state censorship into managerial censorship,
meaning private censorship, as well. When interpreted as this Article would read it, Forbes would

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 18:315, 2001

D. Questions Raised by the Institution-BalancingApproach
As the majority suggests in Forbes, there does not appear to be any
constitutional impediment to congressional legislation requiring publicly
owned stations to provide generalized access to their political debates. The
question remains whether, as a policy matter, permitting discretion rather
than requiring inclusion can be seen as a benefit to political discourse
rather than a danger to democratic norms. Does the Court's market-wide,
institution-balancing approach to electoral speech on television adequately
justify the potentially exclusionary results of state-broadcaster discretion?
Are there particular reasons to be skeptical about the likely success of the
Court's second-best, contrapuntal approach in Forbes?
1.

Telegenicity and Commercialization of the Public

There are a number of leaps of faith entailed in the decision to permit
broadcaster discretion in order to enhance inter-institutional balance. First
is a trust (such as displayed by the majority opinion in Forbes) in the
professional newsworthiness
decisions
of journalists, whether
governmental or private. Trust in those journalistic decisions-not that
they are in any given instance "right" in some fundamental way, but,
rather, that they are independent professional judgements and not acts of
governmental censorship or propaganda-depends on structures of
autonomy and accountability. On this view, public broadcasters must not
only adhere to a journalistic code, but must also be subject to structures
leading to institutional independence. If such institutional autonomy and
journalistic standards are in place, then we may question the likelihood of
harm to public discourse from the mere fact that a particular public
broadcasting station is a state-owned entity. And if we support PBS
because we believe in the structures of independence (and similar
autonomy-creating installations in the state-owned broadcast context), then
why not include politics?
On the other hand, the journalistic standards and structural
independence on which this model relies may have a hidden antidemocratic, anti-diversity tilt despite the Court's balancing rationale. In
other words, because the state broadcasters under the Forbes model are
allowed to make viewpoint-neutral decisions on the basis of audience
norms, they may well be using the same kinds of market-oriented factors
as commercial broadcasters to decide on participation. While commercial
require a healthy public broadcasting system with extensive journalistic discretion precisely so that
public broadcasting would be capable realistically of serving as a viable alternative to private
broadcasters' political speech-given the various sorts of constraints to which such speech might be
subject.
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broadcasters' economic incentives will likely lead them to showcase
maverick candidates only when they are extreme enough to attract and
sustain a large audience, public broadcasters too may face different sorts of
incentives that may lead to the same substantive result. Whether to
increase viewership or establish credibility or become true competitors to
the commercial outlets, public stations may also hew to market-based
norms and effectively reproduce mainstream political pictures.
Similarly, one could argue that modem journalistic norms-which
have been transformed by the effect of television-are in themselves likely
to lead to newsworthiness decisions largely based on an impoverished
notion of public discussion. It is by now old hat to criticize the modem
reporter's reliance on the tried and true, on official sources, on
particularistic rather than systemic questioning, and on the media event.
Some argue that professional journalistic norms are limited by journalists'
commitments to the two-party system and the stabilization of the status
quo. 187 On this view, the public stations' professional judgments are
definitionally imbued with norms that promote the status quo (or at least a
narrow spectrum of political discourse). The type of professional judgment
enshrined in Forbes is, for these critics, inevitably tainted by
discriminatory selection criteria. It is by now commonplace to complain
that television's need for entertainment and visual stimulation has led to a
news culture in which the prurient and private is deemed to be more
newsworthy than the substantive. If this is a true description of the culture
of modern news regardless of ownership, then one may question the
Forbes Court's implicit faith in the efficacy of journalistic norms as
wielded by public stations no less than by private, commercial
broadcasters.
Ultimately, the fear of viewpoint-based exclusion may simply miss
the point. The problem with political discourse today is not that the media
discriminates substantively against political viewpoints it does not like.
Rather, the problem is that decisions about television coverage are in
reality made primarily to satisfy the medium's need to entertain.'88 This
explains, for example, why Jesse Ventura-a former wrestler who ran as
an "outsider" candidate-was so avidly covered in his gubernatorial race
in 1998. If these are the non-substantive news values that structurally
shape television's political coverage, then don't we need inclusion rules to
make television coverage of politics simply more substantive? The
media's threat to public discourse is not viewpoint-based journalistic
choices, but entertainment-based selections. Isn't that the real difficulty
with the professionalism and the viewpoint neutrality standards adopted by
187

E.g., Tushnet, supra note 82, at 1262.

188

E.g., Balkin, supra note 60.
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the Forbes Court? How can we avoid the cascade effect of entertainmentbased choices in the mainstream media's political coverage?
There are several-albeit partial-responses to this challenge. So
long as the selection decisions are made by journalists applying
professional journalism norms, the problem of programmatic ideological
selections of viewpoint by powerful government entities is not raised.
Thus, at worst, the public stations, like private broadcasters, would be
engaging in an impoverished and entertainment-oriented approach. This
would not, under traditional doctrine, raise the kind of constitutional
problem entailed by government propaganda. At least there would not be
particular reason to be concerned about the involvement of the state qua
state.
Moreover, while the point about the capture of politics by
entertainment is an important critique of political coverage generally, it
should have slightly less impact in the narrower debate context. It may
well be that reliance on the criteria of entertainment and telegenicity
would, in practice, lead to greater debate inclusion-particularly of
extremely center-challenging candidates. The very people that a
conservative ideological approach would exclude might be considered
prime debate participants, if they are sufficiently "entertaining."
Finally, while public television is increasingly coming to resemble its
commercial competitors in terms of advertising and sponsorship, one can
nevertheless suspect on the basis of past public programming that public
stations do not have precisely the same interpretation of norms of
entertainment and telegenicity and might thus be somewhat less
constrained by such exigencies than commercial outlets.
2.

The Claimed Salutary Effects of Structure

The second leap of faith required by the Forbes Court's media
strategy is that structural independence and FCC review will suffice to
hold at bay politics-skewing abuses of governmental power. A skeptic
might question the degree to which a state employee-even if a journalist
by trade-could really be independent of his governmental masters. 89
189 Some have argued that the Eighth Circuit's concern in Forbes about government
censorship and propaganda "loses its theoretical power when one considers the safeguards of the
public interest standard." Erick Howard, Comment, Debating PBS: Public Broadcasting and the
Power to Exclude Political Candidatesfrom Televised Debates, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 435, 452
(1995). This rather sanguine approach relies on the notion that every broadcaster's responsibility to
operate in the public interest under FCC licensing supervision is sufficient to "negate the danger of
influence over, or collusion with, the broadcaster." Id. On this view, because the FCC has the ultimate
power to eliminate the station's license, "FCC authority negates whatever suppressive influences state
governments might have over broadcasters." Id. Untroubled reliance on FCC oversight in this kind of
argument is highly optimistic in light of the FCC's deregulatory approach to content and changes in
license renewal standards under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
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Anecdotal assessments and arguments from history are very difficult to
evaluate. How can we be certain that structural independence "really"
works? Are a few examples of independence and anti-Administration
editorializing sufficient to assure us that structural safety nets are
preferable to mandated access rules? Even more significantly, mustn't the
effectiveness of any given structural separation be assessed on its facts and
not in the abstract?
In any event, there remains the underlying question of whether public
broadcasting entities-even if they will not in most instances promote
partisan advantage in their programming decisions-will nevertheless act
in ways that "stabilize the status quo" and "tilt public understanding in
favor of the political 'ins' or against the political 'outs. ' 190 Is an antidemocratic skew evidenced by the AETN's sense that journalistic norms
would characterize major-party candidates as serious and newsworthy
simply because of their party membership, even if they may have had no
better chance of winning the election than Forbes? Some may suggest that
the professional journalistic norms may be fundamentally conservative.' 9 1
While such generalizations can be questioned in light of the
journalistic obsession with identifying the new, these observations
nevertheless suggest that empirical data be gathered on the nature of such
journalistic norms and the degree of actual independence in the multi-party
public broadcasting regime.192
3.

On the FCC's History of Deference

Another arrow in the skeptic's quiver is the FCC's history of
restrictive interpretations of partisanship under section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934. To the extent that the FCC has interpreted
the equal opportunities exemptions with significant deference to
broadcaster newsworthiness judgments, access proponents would argue
that FCC oversight is unlikely to ferret out the more subtle forms of
electoral discrimination by state-owned broadcasters in the political
context.
Although courts have rejected citizen standing to sue for debate
190 Tushnet, supra note 82, at 1262.
191 Professor Tushnet, for example, characterizes the journalistic norms applied in Forbes as
evidencing a commitment to the two-party system. He finds the limitations on speech that result from
the application of these professional norms to be "at least as troubling as those that emerge when
politicians act for partisan advantage." Tushnet, supra note 82, at 1262. Because of this, the deferential
review that might be appropriate for quangos in the abstract may presumably be thought inappropriate
in the context of public station coverage of debates.
192 While Professor Tushnet's argument may be persuasive in the context of Forbes' own
facts, I am wary of such generalizations about professional journalism norms. The AETC's decision to
include Forbes in debates during the next election in which he participated suggests that journalistic
norms will not always be applied in a status quo-enhancing fashion.
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exclusion under the political programming provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934, the FCC has provided ground-rules for
broadcast of political debates. Such ground-rules-based on non-partisan
selection of participants-have enabled the proliferation of such debates.
The Communications Act of 1934 provides both a candidate nondiscrimination provision whenever political aspirants "use" a broadcast
station under section 315, and a limited right of access to the air for federal
political candidates under section 312(a)(7). Section 315 provides that if a
licensee permits a legally qualified candidate for public office to "use" his
station, it must provide equal opportunities to all the candidate's opponents
for the same office at non-discriminatory rates (and, at certain times during
the election period, at the station's "lowest unit rates").' 93 As noted above,
section 312(a)(7) provides that federal candidates must be provided
reasonable access to the air, but t94does not specifically provide a right of
access to any particular program.
Because of the Commission's broad interpretation of section 315's
equal opportunities provisions through the 1950s, broadcasters shied away
from more than the minimal news and public affairs programming, and
televised political debates were thought to be out of the question. 95 In
1959, Congress amended section 315 to assure that the broadcast stations'
equal opportunities obligations would not be triggered by candidates'
appearances in four sorts of public affairs programming: bona fide
newscasts, bona fide news interviews, bona fide news documentaries (if
the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the
subject 96
covered by the documentary), and on-the-spot coverage of news
events.1
Despite this amendment, however, the Commission did not interpret
debates as falling within the ambit of the exemptions to the equal
opportunities provision until 1975. The momentous televised presidential
debates of 1960 between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy were made
possible only when Congress specifically suspended the application of the
equal opportunities statute to the debates.' 97
Finally, the FCC held in Aspen Institute" that a debate between two
193 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)-(b) (1994). The concept "legally qualified candidate" is not
specifically defined in the Communications Act, and, therefore, the application of § 315 depends on
the state law definition of candidate qualification. As for the meaning of the term "use," it has been
interpreted to include any candidate appearance (including by picture or voice).
194 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994). Section 312(a)(7) provides: "The Commission may revoke
any station license . . . for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." Id.
195 See Interpretive Opinion re Section 315 of the Act, 26 F.C.C. 715 (1959).
196 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994).
197 See, e.g., NEALE, supra note 66, at 1-3.
198 55 F.C.C.2d 697 (1975), affd sub nom., Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.
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or more candidates would qualify as on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide
news event exempt from the equal opportunities provision of section
315(a) when sponsored by third parties. Subsequently, in Henry Geller,9 9
the Commission expanded the holding of Aspen Institute by holding that
broadcaster-sponsored political debates would also be exempt from section
315 as on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events. The only limitation
on the applicability of the section 3 15(a) exemption is that the candidate's
appearance in the debate in fact be the result of a bona fide news judgment
on the part of the sponsoring organization rather than an intent to further
any particular candidacy. Debates warrant section 315 exemption if they
are covered live, based upon the good faith determination of licensees that
they are "bona fide news events" worthy of presentation, and provided
further that there is no evidence of broadcaster favoritism.20 0
As for broadcaster-sponsored debates, the Commission made clear
that so long as the broadcaster has control over the format (and the debate
is not simply an info-mercial 2staged
by the candidates themselves), the
01
debate exemption would apply.
In application, the Commission's rules have permitted non-inclusive
debates, regardless of whether the broadcast station is public or
commercial and regardless of the debate sponsor's identity. 2 2 When
assessed along with the FCC staff's relatively thin definition of
partisanship, the FCC's approach to debate access has been rather
deferential to broadcaster discretion.20 3 In turn, courts have been
deferential to the FCC's approach. 0 4
1976).
199 95 F.C.C.2d 1236 (1983).
200 Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 351.
201 See Fulani v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the FCC's debate
standards).
202 See, e.g., In re Cyril E. Sagan, I F.C.C.R. 10 (1986).
203 See. e.g., Jim Trinity, 7 F.C.C.R. 3199 (1992) (rejecting the request of a Republican
candidate for U.S. Senate in the 1992 California election to be included in a public entity's broadcast
of a debate among other Republican candidates; finding "no basis for believing" that licensee's
selections were not based on bona fide news judgment; and adopting an illiberal reading of the
candidate's § 312(a)(7) access request). The Trinity decision is implicitly based on the proposition that
comparative poll data would suffice to make a broadcast station's exclusion of a candidate simply a
matter of bona fide news worthiness. See also George A. Lato, 6 F.C.C.R. 5840 (1991) (rejecting claim
that broadcast stations had violated § 315(a) by not inviting a legally-qualified candidate for the office
of governor of Louisiana to be included in a debate sponsored by the stations and concluding that
"predetermined use of 7% as the cut off point" was not unreasonable and did not indicate a choice to
promote the candidacy of the Democratic participant). In its analysis of whether the § 315 exemption
should be disregarded in Lato because the exclusion of a candidate resulted from partisan intent, the
Commission Staff refused to look at the overall effects of an exclusion as an indication of intent. For
other decisions permitting broadcaster discretion, see, for example, In re Complaint of Socialist
Workers Campaign, 88 F.C.C.2d 349 (1981); In re Complaint of Paula S. Schlesinger, 87 F.C.C.2d
773 (1980); and In re Complaints of The American Independent Party Against ABC et al., 62 F.C.C.2d
4(1976).
204 See, e.g., Kennedy v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming FCC's rejection of
the argument by Sen. Edward Kennedy supporters during his presidential bid that he had been denied
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Lessons from the 2000 Debate Season

The fourth leap of faith in the Forbes approach is that public
television stations of all kinds will in fact be able to develop as strong
counterweights to the electoral coverage of commercial stations. If public
stations will not in fact be able to perform the salutary checking role that
the ForbesCourt enables, then why should we take the risk of exclusion in
an important (albeit romanticized) aspect of democratic governance?
In the 2000 campaign season, it appeared to be the commercial
broadcasters rather than public entities who featured presidential debates
with third-party candidates. °5 Commercial stations are subject to the
provisions of the FEC. Moreover, because of commercial competition and
the fact that political programming is cheaper to produce than
entertainment programming, commercial broadcasters have recently
developed a multiplicity of political coverage formats.20 6 The demand to
fill airtime in such programming will likely present its own structural
incentives for more expansive political programming on commercial
television. Finally, we should not be overly sanguine about the distinction
between public and private broadcast stations on the issue of economic
incentives. As noted above, public stations are subject both to ideological
pressures entailed by public funding and to the increasing need to raise
funds by corporate sponsorship of their programs.
The most realistic response to those concerns might be that without an
obligation to sponsor and broadcast debates, both public and private
broadcasters would eschew the opportunity except in the most obvious
instances (such as presidential debates). Thus, the end result of an access
regime might well be less coverage, particularly in smaller and more
crowded races. This result is far less desirable from the democratic point
of view than a discretionary approach that might provide public stations an
equal opportunities under § 315 of the Communications Act by the networks' broadcast of a Jimmy
Carter press conference held on the eve of the 1980 presidential primary in New Hampshire and
thought by the complainant to be simply a staged campaign advertisement).
205 For example, both Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan appeared for a debate on NBC's Meet
the Press program. Michael Finnegan & Edwin Chen, Bush and Gore Preparefor the 2 Man Debate,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A13. The group Judicial Watch sponsored a nationally televised
presidential debate on October 20th to which Harry Browne, Pat Buchanan, Al Gore, John Hagelin,
Ralph Nader and Howard Phillips and George Bush had been invited. Bush had early-on refused to
participate in the debate and Gore subsequently declined. Gore Not Debating Third Party Candidates,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 17, 2000, at 4D. Apparently, C-SPAN had agreed to televise the debate
and Fox considered doing so on commercial television.
206 Explicitly political programs include Meet the Press, Face the Nation, Inside Politics,
This Week with Sam Donaldson, and the McLaughlin Group. Ronald Brownstein, Pundits With Your
Pancakes: Sunday Morning Interview Shows Have Sorted Through the Spin Since Meet the Press
Began 50 Years Ago, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at C7; Stephen Hess, Morning News Shows Are
Pushing Politics, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2000, at 15A; Michael Tackett, Tight Race Accentuates
Importance of TV Debates, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2000, at NI.
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incentive to become more serious counterweights to commercial
television.
Moreover, the possibility of an increasing public station role in
electoral debates is supported by the recent decision of NBC and the Fox
network not to require carriage of the first presidential debate between
20 7
candidates Gore and Bush in the 2000 presidential election season.
Admittedly, both NBC and Fox were criticized for their decisions, and this
might render it less likely that presidential debates would be boycotted by
the conventional private broadcasters in the future. 20 8 However, the fact
that these networks broke the ice and did not follow the earlier tradition of
all-network debate coverage suggests that there may be an increasing role
for the public sector in picking up the slack.
In any event, concerns about the public stations' skewing effects
might be less pressing if in fact commercial stations do provide access to
debates and the non-governmental political market is strong enough to
withstand attempts by the public stations to dominate and monopolize the
field.
E.

The Need for EmpiricalStudy

Ultimately, the most important factor in attempting to determine the
effectiveness of the Forbes Court's professionalist approach to debate
participation will be careful consideration of empirical and anecdotal data
in future election contexts.
The first step in that connection is the systematic collection and
dissemination of such data. To date, even if comprehensive collection has
been undertaken, it does not appear to be publicly available. 0 9 The second
step required is precise, contextual measurement of actual effects. Data on
debates should be analyzed with careful attention to debate context and
format, election-specificity, comparison between public and private media,
and coverage in the overall market for electronically transmitted election
information. Conclusions cannot appropriately be drawn from data without
careful assessment of the election-specific differences we can anticipate.
For example, information about public and commercial station coverage of
207 NBC gave its affiliates the option of not broadcasting the debate in favor of a sports
event. Fox aired an entertainment program instead of the debate. Lisa de Moraes, Fox Puts Politics in
Its Place, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at Cl; Jim Rutenberg, TV Audience for Debate is Smaller Than
Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000, at A30; Dan Trigoboff, Debatable Issues, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Oct. 9, 2000, at 5.
208 See, e.g., Bill Carter, The Ratings: Fewer Watched Last Debate Than Most Previous
Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at A25; William E. Kennard, Fox and NBC Renege a Debt, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at A27.

209 Research assistants spent many hours on the Internet and in blanket e-mail solicitations in
fruitless attempts to discover systematically compiled and historically accurate information on public
station debates.

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 18:315, 2001

presidential political contests in closely-contested presidential elections
does not necessarily tell us much about media coverage of races in which
large percentages of voters have made up their minds early in the election
season. Similarly, election-specific data will be most useful in assessing
debate participation in other federal, state, and local elections. Even if a
commercial television station includes all third-party candidates in a
debate in connection with a federal congressional race, it is unclear that
such a station (particularly if it has a multi-state coverage area) will
similarly cover local contests. Thus, it may be that public stations will
exercise a significant gap-filling role under the Forbes model of
journalistic discretion.
Until there is better information, it is wise to be cautious about
definitive choices among competing values at stake in any contested legal
issue. The difficulty of collecting information about third party access to
debates in a systematic manner today demonstrates the need for refined
fact-finding. A second-best alternative that provides the opportunity to
generate and study the information is not an irrational approach under such
circumstances.
Moreover, there is a complex relationship between questions
regarding the nature of the electoral system and questions regarding
participation in televised debates. On one level, we might expect rules
regarding participation in televised debates to reflect the electoral system
as it is. On another level, the rules regarding participation in televised
debates themselves can affect the nature of the electoral system and the
public's perception of the legitimacy of the outcome. Many of the
criticisms of the Forbes Court's approach are as much criticisms of the
electoral system as of the issue of debate access alone.21 ° It would be more
appropriate to debate and effect changes in the electoral system directly
rather than through the indirect medium of rules regarding debate
participation.
Conclusion
Political candidates, election pundits, media observers and the
undecided public all tout the increasing electoral significance of televised
candidate debates. Exclusions of third-party candidates from such debates
lead to lawsuits claiming constitutional violations. In rejecting a First
Amendment right of candidate access even to debates sponsored by stateowned media institutions, the Supreme Court in Forbes opened itself to
forceful criticism for having issued an anti-democratic decision-relying
210 Cf Gardbaum, supra note 49, at 396 (suggesting that if the underlying diversity of
existing opinion is insufficient for meaningful choice regardless of how it is represented on the air,
then probably only direct reforms of the electoral process can address the problem).
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on hyper-technical applications of doctrine to entrench the dominance of
the two-party system and to reify inequalities in political access.
It is true that the Supreme Court in Forbes did not take the
opportunity to use state ownership as a way of opening political discourse
to those disempowered by the dominance of the two-party system. It
refused to justify general constraints on broadcasters' editorial decisions
even though those decisions no doubt involve the state in affecting the
substantive outcome of political contests. It specifically rejected a
constitutional requirement of pre-established, objective criteria for debate
access.
Forbes is more complicated than simply an encomium to the
Democratic and Republican parties, however. It is clearly anti-populist and
relies on journalistic norms and structural autonomy to promote editorial
independence. On the other hand, while it permits journalistic discretion, it
bounds editorial choices by a standard of viewpoint neutrality in the
exceptional circumstances of debates. It implicitly relies on FCC licensing,
administrative oversight, and judicial review to minimize the harms
associated with editorial decisions made by state entities. While the
regulation of public broadcasters qua public broadcasters is disapproved,
the use of the FCC and judicial review to prevent unwholesome
government censorship is not.
Whatever the doctrinal weaknesses of the Court's approach in the
abstract, it is understandable as a functional, second-best approach to a
hard problem. The Forbes Court chooses the middle path between the
extremes of total open access and total broadcaster discretion. It does so
because both expressive and democratic values are implicated in the
debate and a middle-ground, compromise position may be the best
alternative. The Court's decision to opt for bounded editorial discretion
and to require special oversight in the special context of debates is not an
irrational approach to the conflict over open access.
In fact, this Article argues that the Court's approach in Forbes is part
of a particular type of institution-balancing vision of politics in the media.
Public broadcasters, on this model, can serve as balancing alternativescounterweights-to the electoral coverage of the commercial media. In
turn, the variety in the type of public station, as well as the oversight of the
FCC and judicial review, can serve as disincentives to politically partisan
media injections into public discourse.
Whether such a contrapuntal approach to the improvement of political
discourse will actually work is unclear. On the one hand, it may
disempower candidates and undermine the possibility of developing a
public communications system different from the mainstream commercial
broadcast system. In other words, it may do nothing other than allow state
entities to behave and regulate speech as if they were simply private actors
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with no further public interest obligations. Factors such as television's
fascination with entertainment value even in politics, the increasing
commercialization of public television, the deferential attitude of the FCC
to broadcaster programming decisions, and the potential inadequacy of
structural mechanisms to prevent abuse all raise questions about the
ultimate effectiveness of the debate model adopted in the Forbes decision.
On the other hand, the flexibility permitted under Forbes may
promote a renewed commitment to a rejuvenated political discourse
affirmatively managed by governmental agents subject to different kinds
of programming pressures than their commercial counterparts. It may
ensure that public broadcasters are not hamstrung by rigid access rights in
their attempts to create imaginative alternatives to political discourse on
the private stations. If the true goal is the enhancement of political
discourse among the citizenry, then a mechanical open access policy may
retard rather than advance it. Given the hidden limitations revealed by a
hard look at access regimes, the second best alternative of broadcaster
discretion may be worth a skeptical experiment. However, assessing the
results of such an experiment calls for refined, election-specific and
historically-grounded data to be collected and evaluated in a contextspecific fashion.

